draft-ietf-pana-pana-06.txt		draft-ietf-pana-pana-07a.txt
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg		PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia		Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: April 20, 2005 Y. Ohba (Ed.)		Expires: June 1, 2005 Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba		Toshiba
B. Patil		B. Patil
Nokia		Nokia
H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
Siemens		Siemens
A. Yegin		A. Yegin
Samsung		Samsung
October 20, 2004		December 1, 2004
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)		Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-06		draft-ietf-pana-pana-07a
Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable		By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,		patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with		and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.		RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Skipping to change at page 1, line 41:
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2005.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2005.
Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract		Abstract
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) defines a number of		This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
authentication schemes. Network access authentication requires a		Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible
host to authenticate itself before being authorized for sending and		Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
receiving packets. The Protocol for Carrying Authentication for		between clients and access networks. PANA can carry any
Network Access (PANA) is defined in this document. PANA is a		authentication method that can be specified as an EAP method, and it
link-layer agnostic carrier for EAP. PANA specifies the		can be used on any link that can carry IP. PANA protocol
client-to-network access authentication within the scope of an		specification covers the client-to-network access authentication part
overall secure network access framework.		of an overall secure network access framework, which additionally
		includes other protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning,
		access control as a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents		Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1 Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.1 Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		4.3 Authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4 Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		4.4 Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5 Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.5 Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . 19		4.6 Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 20
5.2.1 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21
5.3 Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		4.7.3 AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules . . . . . . . . 23
5.5 Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5.1 Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.6 PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		5.1.1 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.7 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.8 Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.3 PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.9 Updating PaC' Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		5.4 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.10 Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		5.5 Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.11 Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		5.6 Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.12 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 27		5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.12.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 28		5.8 Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.12.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 28		5.9 Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.12.3 AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.10 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.12.4 Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		6. Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.12.5 Example Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		7. PANA Headers and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6. Security and Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		7.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.1 PANA Security Association Establishment . . . . . . . . . 32		7.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2 Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		7.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. PANA Headers and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs . . . . . . . 39
7.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8.1 PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8.2 Message Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		8.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs . . . . . . . 40		8.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1 PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		8.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2 Message Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		8.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		8.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		8.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		8.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . 43		8.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . 44		8.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		8.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		8.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . 44		8.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . 44
8.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.3 AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.3 AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.3.1 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		8.3.1 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.3.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		8.3.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3.3 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		8.3.3 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3.4 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		8.3.4 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		8.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		8.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.3.7 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50		8.3.7 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.11 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.11 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.12 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.12 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54		8.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		8.3.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3.15 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		8.3.15 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . 55		8.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . 55
8.3.17 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56		8.3.17 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.3.18 IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56		8.3.18 IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9. PANA Protocol Message Retransmissions . . . . . . . . . . . 57		9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 58		9.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 58
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		10.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		10.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		10.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		10.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
10.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61		10.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61		10.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61		10.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62		10.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
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11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.8 Livenes Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68		11.8 Livenes Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.9 Mobility Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68		11.9 Mobility Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.10 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68		11.10 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.11 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69		11.11 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70		12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71		13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71		13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72		13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 75		A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 75
		Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 77
1. Introduction		1. Introduction
Network access authentication has traditionally been a layer 2		Providing secure network access service requires access control based
function. This document specifies a protocol that enables EAP to be		on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
transported above the IP layer. As a result, network access		networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
authentication can be made a function of the network layer thereby		are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
achieving link-layer independence for the process of authenticating a		A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client seeking access to a network. At the present time, there are		client and the access network.
no standardized solutions for authenticating a host for network
access at the network layer. The problem statement for which the
PANA protocol is a solution can be found in Appendix A of
[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements].
PANA relies on EAP for the actual authentication of a client. It		Currently there is no standard network-layer solution for
does not define any new authentication protocols or schemes. It		authenticating clients for network access. Appendix A of
enables EAP messages to be carried between the client and the		[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements] describes the problem statement that led
network. The actual choice of a specific EAP method to be run over		to the development of PANA.
PANA is dependent on the underlying access network technology. The
key factor in the choice of the EAP method is the determination of
whether the lower layer (link/physical) provides security for the
PANA messages.
A secure network access authentication framework goes beyond just		Scope of this work is identified as designing a link-layer agnostic
authenticating the client to the network. Other aspects such as		transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
address configuration, data traffic security, access control filters		Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication
and separation of the enforcement point from the protocol end-point		methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various
are documented in [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp].		authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP
		above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
		method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
		technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
		lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
This document specifies the client-network interaction and the		Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
messages defined for this purpose.		Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-pana-requirements]. Potential security
		threats for network-layer access authentication protocol are
		discussed in [I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval]. These have been essential
		in defining the requirements [I-D.ietf-pana-requirements] on the PANA
		protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed by the
		chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
		There are components that are part of a complete secure network
		solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
		including IP address configuration, authentication method choice,
		filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP
		protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see
		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are
		recommended to go through the PANA Framework document
		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading this protocol
		specification document.
1.1 Specification of Requirements		1.1 Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements		In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key		of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",		words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document		"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology		2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC):		PANA Client (PaC):
The client side of the protocol that resides in the host device.		The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device
It is responsible for providing the credentials in order to prove		(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the
its identity for network access authorization.		credentials in order to prove its identity for network access
		authorization.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):		PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is		The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is
to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and		to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and
authorize network access to the device associated with the client		authorize network access to the device associated with the client
and identified by a Device Identifier (DI). Note the		and identified by a Device Identifier (DI). Note the
authentication and authorization procedure can, according to the		authentication and authorization procedure can, according to the
EAP model, be also offloaded to the backend AAA infrastructure.		EAP model, be also offloaded to the backend AAA infrastructure.
Skipping to change at page 7, line 19:
significant identifier that is made available by the local		significant identifier that is made available by the local
protocol stack (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id) of a connected		protocol stack (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id) of a connected
device.		device.
Enforcement Point (EP):		Enforcement Point (EP):
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies		A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of		(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
client devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally)		client devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally)
cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for		cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for
generating filters on the EP.		generating filters on the EP. EP and PAA may be co-located.
Network Access Provider (NAP):		Network Access Provider (NAP):
A service provider that provides physical and link-layer		A service provider that provides physical and link-layer
connectivity to an access network it manages.		connectivity to an access network it manages.
AAA-Key:		AAA-Key:
A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to		A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to
the authenticator [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].		the authenticator [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].
Skipping to change at page 9, line 7:
this phase from authorized phase, and returns back there upon		this phase from authorized phase, and returns back there upon
successful re-authentication.		successful re-authentication.
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the		o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be		access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects		sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that		without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed		either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would do the job.		liveness tests would do the job.
PaC PAA Message[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message
-----------------------------------------------------		-----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase		// Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover		-----> PANA-PAA-Discover
<----- PANA-Start-Request		<----- PANA-Start-Request
-----> PANA-Start-Answer		-----> PANA-Start-Answer
// Authentication phase		// Authentication phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */		<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer
-----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */		-----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */
Skipping to change at page 9, line 32:
// Authorization phase (IP data traffic allowed)		// Authorization phase (IP data traffic allowed)
<----- PANA-Ping-Request		<----- PANA-Ping-Request
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer		-----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase		// Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request		-----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer		<----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA Messages in a Session		Figure 1: Illustration of PANA Messages in a Session
		Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
		flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated.
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is		Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a		possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA		shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generating per-message authentication codes that provide		SA helps generating per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication.		integrity protection and authentication.
PANA also allows creation of a new PANA session with a new PAA out of		PANA also allows creation of a new PANA session with a new PAA out of
an existing session with another PAA. This optimization allows PaC		an existing session with another PAA. This optimization allows PaC
achieve quicker authorization without having to run EAP upon movement		achieve quicker authorization without having to run EAP upon movement
(changing PAAs).		(changing PAAs).
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the		Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.		incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
4. Protocol Details		4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA		The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session.		session.
4.1 Discovery and Handshake Phase		4.1 Payload Encoding
		The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
		(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
		AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
		description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
		the document.
		o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is used for making PAA
		discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
		o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
		protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
		mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
		o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
		an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
		o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
		o MAC AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity
		protects the PANA message.
		o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.
		o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution
		results.
		o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
		o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.
		o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
		o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier
		of a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
		o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier.
		o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
		the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
		used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
		o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in
		cyrptographic key computations.
		o IP-Address AVP: contains an IP Address of the PaC.
		4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase
When a PaC attaches to a network, and knows that it has to discover a		When a PaC attaches to a network, and knows that it has to discover a
PAA, it SHOULD send a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known link		PAA, it SHOULD send a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known link
local multicast address (TBD) and UDP port (TBD). The PANA PAA		local multicast address (TBD) and UDP port (TBD). The PAA discovery
discovery assumes that the PaC and the PAA are one hop away from each		assumes that the PaC and the PAA are one hop away from each other.
other. If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA (based on		If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA (based on
pre-configuration), it MAY unicast the PANA-PAA-Discover message to		pre-configuration), it MAY unicast the PANA-PAA-Discover message to
that address.		that address.
When the PAA receives a PANA-PAA-Discover message from a PaC, the PAA		When the PAA receives a PANA-PAA-Discover message from a PaC, the PAA
SHOULD unicast a PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC.		SHOULD unicast a PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC.
The PaC MAY also choose to start sending packets before getting		The PaC MAY also choose to start sending data packets before getting
authenticated. In that case, the network may detect this and the PAA		authenticated. The EP in an access network that implements PANA
MAY send an unsolicited PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC in		SHOULD drop unauthorized packets upon receipt. Additionally, the EP
addition to filtering the unauthorized traffic. The EP is the node		MAY also take this traffic as an indication of unauthorized PaC and
that can detect such activity. The PAA-to-EP protocol MAY be used		notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA notification SHOULD be sent via
for this purpose.		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In response, the PAA SHOULD send an
		unsolicited PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC. This is called
		"traffic-driven PAA discovery" (an alternative to PaC explicitly
		soliciting for PAA). Note that this optional feature MAY NOT be
		present in all deployments, therefore PaCs MUST NOT assume its
		availability.
When a PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it		When a PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter an		responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter an
authentication phase. The answer message copies the sequence number.		authentication phase.
There can be multiple PAAs on the link and a PaC may receive multiple		There can be multiple PAAs on the link and a PaC may receive multiple
PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The authentication and		PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The authentication and
authorization result does not depend on which PAA is chosen by the		authorization result does not depend on which PAA is chosen by the
PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that sent the first		PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that sent the first
response.		response.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a		A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a
cookie. The sequence number is set to a randomly picked initial		cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
sequence number. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from		consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
resource consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers. The cookie is		PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA
computed in such a way that it does not require any per-session state		can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the
maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the cookie returned in a		same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that,
PANA-Start-Answer message. The exact algorithms and syntax used for		the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require
generating cookies does not affect interoperability and hence is not		any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the
specified here. An example algorithm is described below.		cookie returned in a PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery
		that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery".
		The exact algorithms and syntax used for generating cookies does not
		affect interoperability and hence is not specified here. An example
		algorithm is described below.
Cookie =		Cookie =
<secret-version> | HMAC_SHA1( <Device-Id of PaC> , <secret> )		<secret-version> | HMAC_SHA1( <Device-Id of PaC> , <secret> )
where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the PAA,		where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the PAA,
<secret-version> is an index used for choosing the secret for		<secret-version> is an index used for choosing the secret for
generating the cookie and '|' indicates concatenation. The		generating the cookie and '|' indicates concatenation. The
secret-version should be changed frequently enough to prevent replay		secret-version should be changed frequently enough to prevent replay
attacks. The secret key is valid for a certain time frame.		attacks. The secret key is valid for a certain time frame.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a		When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a
PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a		PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.		Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
Skipping to change at page 11, line 17:
secret-version should be changed frequently enough to prevent replay		secret-version should be changed frequently enough to prevent replay
attacks. The secret key is valid for a certain time frame.		attacks. The secret key is valid for a certain time frame.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a		When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a
PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a		PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.		Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it		When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the		verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie has the expected value. If the computed cookie is		received cookie has the expected value. If the computed cookie is
valid, the protocol enters an authentication phase. Otherwise, it		valid, the protocol enters the authentication phase. Otherwise, it
MUST silently discard the received message.		MUST silently discard the received message.
Initial EAP Request MAY be optionally carried by the		Initial EAP Request MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)		PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This		message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be		optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be
stateless.		stateless.
A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration		A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration
(PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to		(PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to
indicate required and available capabilities for the network access.		indicate required and available capabilities for the network access.
These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match		These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match
even before the authentication takes place. But these AVPs are		even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are
provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are		provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are
certain security risks involved in using the provided information.		certain security risks involved in using the provided information.
See Section 11 for further discussion on this.		See Section 11 for further discussion on this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the		If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the
PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried		PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried
in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.		in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
In any case, PANA MUST NOT generate an EAP message on behalf of EAP
peer or EAP (pass-through) authenticator.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering an		The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering an
authentication phase even when the PaC is pre-configured with PAAs IP		authentication phase even when the PaC is pre-configured with PAAs IP
address and the PANA-PAA-Discover message is unicast.		address and the PANA-PAA-Discover message is unicast.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in PANA-Start-Request and		A Nonce AVP MUST be included in PANA-Start-Request and
PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a PANA		PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a PANA
SA.		SA.
A PANA-Start-Request message that carries a Cookie AVP is never		A PANA-Start-Request message of a stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be
retransmitted. A PANA-Start-Request message that does not carry a		on a retransmission timer as this voids the statelessness on the PAA.
Cookie AVP is retransmitted based on timer. A PANA-Start-Answer		Instead, the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover until it
message that carries a Cookie AVP is retransmitted based on timer. A		receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the
PANA-Start-Answer message that does not carry a Cookie AVP is never		PANA-Start-Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request
retransmitted based on timer.		message. The PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless
		discovery by the presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request
		message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
		message when stateful PAA discovery is used.
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery		It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery
and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a		and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a
PANA-Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover		PANA-Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover
message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently		message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently
discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it		discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it
has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., no		has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., no
Cookie AVP is included in the message) for the PaC. In this case PAA		Cookie AVP is included in the message) for the PaC. In this case the
will retransmit PANA-Start-Request based on a timer, if PaC doesn't		PAA will retransmit PANA-Start-Request based on a timer, if the PaC
respond in time (message was lost for example). If the PAA had sent		doesn't respond in time (message was lost for example). If the PAA
a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for the PaC		had sent a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for
(i.e., a Cookie AVP was included in the message), then it SHOULD		the PaC (i.e., a Cookie AVP was included in the message), then it
answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message.		SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake		Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3		phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase that		shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase that
is triggered by data traffic.		is triggered by data traffic.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)		-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]		<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
Skipping to change at page 13, line 5:
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)		---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism		------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]		<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie]		------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
(continued to authentication phase)		(continued to authentication phase)
Figure 3: Example Sequence for Discovery and Handshake when discovery		Figure 3: Example Sequence for Discovery and Handshake when discovery
is triggered by data traffic		is triggered by data traffic
4.2 Authentication Phase		4.3 Authentication Phase
The main task in authentication phase is to carry EAP messages		The main task in authentication phase is to carry EAP messages
between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and Response messages are		between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and Response messages are
carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-Auth-Answer messages are		carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-Auth-Answer messages are
simply used to acknowledge receipt of the requests. As an		simply used to acknowledge receipt of the requests. As an
optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include the EAP		optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include the EAP
Response. Another optimization allows optionally carrying the first		Response. Another optimization allows optionally carrying the first
EAP Request/Response in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as		EAP Request/Response in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as
described in Section 4.1		described in Section 4.2
When an EAP Success/Failure message is sent from a PAA, the message		PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one
is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message. The		with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional
PANA-Bind-Request messages MUST be acknowledged with a		feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When
PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example sequence		performed separately, the result of first EAP authentication is
in an authentication phase.		signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
		message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the
		next. See Section 4.7 for a detailed discussion on NAP/ISP separate
		authentication.
		The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
		message sent from PAA to PaC. This message carries the final EAP
		authentication method message (whether it is the second method of NAP
		and ISP separate authentication, or the sole authentication method)
		and the result of PANA authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message
		MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4
		shows an example sequence in an authentication phase (no separate
		authentication).
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
--------------------------------------------------------------------		--------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from discovery and handshake phase)		(continued from discovery and handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response
[Session-Id]		[Session-Id]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id]		[Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP-Response		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP-Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)		<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, IP-Address,		[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]		Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, PPAC, MAC]		[Session-Id, Device-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Figure 4: Example Sequence in Authentication Phase		Figure 4: Example Sequence in Authentication Phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during		When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication phase and the keys are successfully derived, the		the authentication phase and the keys are successfully derived, the
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer and/or		PANA message that carries the EAP Success
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages, and all subsequent		(PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request, PANA-Bind-Request) and any subsequent
PANA messages MUST contain a MAC AVP.		message MUST contain a MAC AVP.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is		The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s), and		also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s), and
the IP address of the PAA to the PANA SA. To achieve this, the		the IP address of the PAA to the PANA SA. To achieve this, the
PANA-Bind-Request SHOULD contain the device identifier(s) of the		PANA-Bind-Request SHOULD contain the device identifier(s) of the
EP(s) in Device-Id AVP(s) when they are either MAC or IP address(es),		EP(s) in Device-Id AVP(s) when they are either MAC or IP address(es),
and the IP address of the PAA in an IP-Address AVP. PANA-Bind-Answer		and the IP address of the PAA in an IP-Address AVP. PANA-Bind-Answer
SHOULD contain PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is		SHOULD contain PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is
already presented with that of EP(s). The PaC MUST use the same type		already presented with that of EP(s). The PaC MUST use the same type
of device identifier as contained in the PANA-Bind-Request message.		of device identifier as contained in the PANA-Bind-Request message.
This exchange when protected by a MAC AVP prevents man-in-the-middle		This exchange when protected by a MAC AVP prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks. The PANA-Bind-Request message MAY also contain a		attacks. The PANA-Bind-Request message MAY also contain a
Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if link-layer or network-layer		Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if link-layer or network-layer
ciphering should be initiated after PANA. No link layer or network		ciphering should be initiated after PANA. No link-layer or
layer specific information is included in the Protection-Capability		network-layer specific information is included in the
AVP. When the information is preconfigured on the PaC and the PAA		Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware of
this AVP can be omitted. It is assumed that at least PAA is aware of
the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol		the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol
does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP		does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP
will be used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic.		will be used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic.
Additionally, PANA-Bind-Request MUST include a		Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message MUST include a
Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP, which helps PAA to inform PaC		Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP, which helps the PAA to
about whether a new IP address MUST be configured and the available		inform the PaC about whether a new IP address MUST be configured and
methods to do so. PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in order to indicate		the available methods to do so. The PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in
its choice of method when there is a match between the methods		order to indicate its choice of method when there is a match between
offered by the PAA and the methods available on the PaC. When there		the methods offered by the PAA and the methods available on the PaC.
is no match, a PPAC AVP MUST NOT be included and the Result-Code AVP		When there is no match, a PPAC AVP MUST NOT be included and the
MUST be set to PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED in the		Result-Code AVP MUST be set to PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED in
PANA-Bind-Answer message.		the PANA-Bind-Answer message.
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be retransmitted		PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be retransmitted
based on the retransmission rule described in Section 5.3.		based on the retransmission rule described in Section 5.2.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without		EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP-Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When		sending an EAP-Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When
this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the		this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the
PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not		PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not
change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower		change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower
layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout		layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout
on the PaC.		on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an		There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP-Success message but network access authorization fails due to,		EAP-Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA proxy or authorization locally		e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA proxy or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send		rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send
PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If		PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
a AAA-Key is established between PaC and PAA by the time when the		a AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
EAP-Success is generated by the EAP server (this is the case when the		the EAP-Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
EAP method provides protected success indication), this PANA-Bind		case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), this
message exchange MUST be protected with a MAC AVP and with carrying a		PANA-Bind message exchange MUST be protected with a MAC AVP and carry
Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA session MUST be deleted after		a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA session MUST be deleted
the PANA-Bind message exchange.		immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.
4.3 Authorization Phase		4.4 Authorization Phase
Once an authentication phase or a re-authentication phase		Once an authentication phase or a re-authentication phase
successfully completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can		successfully completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can
send and receive IP data traffic through EP and the PANA session		send and receive IP data traffic through EP and the PANA session
enters an authorization phase. In this phase, PANA-Ping-Request and		enters an authorization phase. In this phase, PANA-Ping-Request and
PANA-Ping-Answer messages are used for testing the liveness of the		PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for testing the liveness of the
PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the PaC and the PAA are allowed		PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the PaC and the PAA are allowed
to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to the communicating peer		to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to the communicating peer
whenever they need to make sure the availability of the session on		whenever they need to make sure the availability of the session on
the peer and expect the peer to return a PANA-Ping-Answer message.		the peer and expect the peer to return a PANA-Ping-Answer message.
Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be		Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be
protected with a MAC AVP when a PANA SA is available.		protected with a MAC AVP when a PANA SA is available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC		Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have		and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation		to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
Skipping to change at page 15, line 43:
Figure 5: Example Sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test		Figure 5: Example Sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC]		<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC]		-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 6: Example Sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test		Figure 6: Example Sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.4 Re-authentication Phase		4.5 Re-authentication Phase
A PANA session in an authorization phase can enter a		A PANA session in an authorization phase can enter a
re-authentication phase to extend the current session lifetime by		re-authentication phase to extend the current session lifetime by
re-executing EAP. Once the re-authentication phase successfully		re-executing EAP. Once the re-authentication phase successfully
completes, the session re-enters the authorization phase. Otherwise,		completes, the session re-enters the authorization phase. Otherwise,
the session is deleted.		the session is deleted.
When a PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a		When a PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a		PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the		Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the
Skipping to change at page 17, line 24:
[Session-Id, MAC]		[Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response
[Session-Id, MAC]		[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP-Response		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP-Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)		<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,		[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, Key-Id,
IP-Address, Key-Id, Lifetime,		IP-Address, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC]		[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Figure 7: Example Sequence for re-authentication initiated by PaC		Figure 7: Example Sequence for re-authentication initiated by PaC
4.5 Termination Phase		4.6 Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be		A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from		initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and		the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
the PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect		the PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures.		indication and session revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.		The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA established between the PaC and		When there is an established PANA SA established between the PaC and
the PAA, all messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be		the PAA, all messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be
Skipping to change at page 19, line 5:
PANA-Termination-Request receives a valid acknowledgment, all states		PANA-Termination-Request receives a valid acknowledgment, all states
maintained for the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.		maintained for the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC]		-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC]		<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 8: Example Sequence for Session Termination		Figure 8: Example Sequence for Session Termination
5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules		4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
5.1 Payload Encoding		PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in an
		authentication phase to support separate NAP and ISP authentication
		as described in this section. A typical network access
		authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the ISP.
		This separation allows PaC to perform an additional authentication
		method for receiving differentiated services from the NAP.
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs		Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in an
(Attribute Value Pairs). A brief description of the AVPs defined in		authentication phase is designed only for separate NAP and ISP
this document is listed below:		authentication. It is not for running arbitrary number of EAP
		sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try another
		EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
		authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is used for making		Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication
handshake robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.		and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent.
		Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a
		network access authorization decision based on the success or failure
		of each authentication is a network policy issue.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains information which protection		4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
should be initiated after the PANA exchange (e.g., link-layer or
network layer protection).
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier of the PaC or an EP.		When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
A device identifier is represented as a pair of device identifier		to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
type and device identifier value. Either a layer-2 address or an		operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
IP address is used for the device identifier value when this AVP		Section 4.2
is present.		In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
		availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication
		([I-D.ietf-pana-framework]) by setting the S-flag on the message
		header of the PANA-Start-Request.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.		If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
		PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
		authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
		message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is
		not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
		message sent back to the PAA.
o MAC AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that protects a		If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one
PANA message PDU.		authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
		described in Section 4.2.
o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.		When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
		EAP Request MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request message.
		(If the initial EAP Request were contained in the PANA-Start-Request
		message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC cannot tell whether
		the EAP Request is for NAP authentication or ISP authentication.)
o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution		4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
results.
o Session-Id AVP: contains the session identifier value.		When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
		phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
		PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
		in Section 4.3
o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.		o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
		be set.
o Failed-AVP: contains the offending AVP that caused a failure.		o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message as well as a
		PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request
		message MUST be used at the end of the first EAP authentication
		and the PANA-Bind-Request MUST be used for the second EAP
		authentication. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be
		acknowledged with a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message.
o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the information		o If the first EAP authentication has failed, the PAA can choose not
on a NAP and an ISP, respectively.		to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing the S-flag of
		the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. In this case, the S-flag
		of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message sent by the PaC MUST be
		cleared. If the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message
		is set when the first EAP authentication has failed, the PaC can
		choose not to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing
		the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
		EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations,
		the PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the
		second EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier.		o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
		ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
		authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
		currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
		When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
		set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
		NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Conveys the list		When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
of IP address configuration methods available when sent by the		phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the
PAA, and the chosen method when sent by the PaC.		lower-layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in
		the separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys
		(AAA-Key).
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value.		4.7.3 AAA-Key Calculation
o IP-Address AVP: contains an IP Address of a PaC.		When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
		phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the
		lower-layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in
		the separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In
		this case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as
		well as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second
		EAP authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the
		AAA-Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
		PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged
		in authorized phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase
		MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
		authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
		second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
		EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
		second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
		derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
		and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
		and second EAP authentications succeed.
5.2 Transport Layer		5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules
		5.1 Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number		PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is TBD. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover are always		is TBD. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover are always
unicast. PANA-PAA-Discover MAY be unicast when the PaC knows the IP		unicast. PANA-PAA-Discover MAY be unicast when the PaC knows the IP
address of the PAA.		address of the PAA.
5.2.1 Fragmentation		5.1.1 Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it		PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when		relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed.		needed.
5.3 Sequence Number and Retransmission		5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery		PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages.		of messages.
PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be used		PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be used
for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in a		for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in a
request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit		request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new		unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next		requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence		message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
Skipping to change at page 20, line 48:
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms		When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the		of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to PANA-PAA-Discover, and		expected value. This check does not apply to PANA-PAA-Discover, and
the very first request messages.		the very first request messages.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms		When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that		of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one		of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time.		outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on timer at until a response is		PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the		response is received (in which case the retransmission timer is
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the		stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). The retransmission timer		(in which case the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
SHOULD be calculated as described in [RFC2988] to provide congestion
control. See Section 9 for default timer and maximum retransmission		The initial discovery and handshake phase requires special handling.
count parameters.		PaC MUST retransmit PANA-PAA-Discover if a subsequent
		PANA-Start-Request is not received in time. Even though a
		PANA-Start-Request is received, PANA-PAA-Discover may still have to
		be retransmitted. This is because a stateless PAA discovery requires
		one time transmission of a solicited PANA-Start-Request. PAA MUST
		NOT start a timer and retransmit the request in order to avoid state
		creation. If the received PANA-Start-Request included a Cookie AVP
		(an indication of stateless discovery), PaC MUST retransmit
		PANA-PAA-Discover until the first PANA-Auth-Request is received.
		Otherwise, PaC can rely on PAA to retransmit the PANA-Start-Requests
		as soon as PaC receives the first one (i.e., PaC can stop sending
		PANA-PAA-Discover).
		The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
		[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default
		timer and maximum retransmission count parameters.
PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. Last transmitted		PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. Last transmitted
PANA answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer and		PANA answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer and
that generates a retransmission of the last request. When available,		that generates a retransmission of the last request. When available,
a cached answer can be used instead of fully processing the		a cached answer can be used instead of fully processing the
retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.		retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a		PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.		retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
		5.3 PANA Security Association
		A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
		authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is
		not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is
		produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP
		authentications are performed in sequence in a single PANA
		authentication phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived.
		If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys.
		When a new AAA-Key is derived as a result of EAP-based
		re-authentication, any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be
		updated to a new one that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order
		to distinguish the new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be
		carried in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at
		the end of the EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new
		AAA-Key. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a
		value that uniquely identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session.
		The PANA-Bind-Answer message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
		message) sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a
		Key-Id AVP with the same AAA-Key identifier carried in the request.
		PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry
		a MAC AVP whose value is computed by using the new PANA-MAC-KEY
		derived from the new AAA-Key (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the
		PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from two AAA-Keys). Although the
		specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of
		Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically increasing
		numbers.
		The created PANA SA is deleted when the corresponding PANA session is
		deleted. The lifetime of the PANA SA is the same as the lifetime of
		the PANA session for simplicity.
		PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
		below:
		PANA Session attributes:
		* Session-Id
		* Device-Id of PaC
		* IP address of PaC (may be the same as the Device-Id of PaC)
		* IP address of PAA
		* List of device identifiers of EPs
		* Sequence number of the last transmitted request
		* Sequence number of the last received request
		* Last transmitted message payload
		* Retransmission interval
		* Session lifetime
		* Protection-Capability
		* PANA SA attributes:
		+ Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
		+ Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
		+ AAA-Key
		+ AAA-Key Identifier
		+ PANA_MAC_KEY
		The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is
		used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one
		AAA-Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one
		failed and one successful NAP and ISP separate authentication (see
		Section 4.7), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single
		key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
		following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
		AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
		The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way:
		PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of
		HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
		where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in
		use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of AAA-Key MUST be N bits
		or longer. See Section Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the
		PANA_MAC_KEY.
5.4 Message Authentication Code		5.4 Message Authentication Code
A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP		A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP
for cryptographically protecting the message.		for cryptographically protecting the message.
When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the		When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the
MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way:		MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way:
MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU)		MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU)
Skipping to change at page 22, line 32:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-PAA-Discover.
+ PANA-Update-Request.		+ PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid		+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid
PANA-Auth-Request.		PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first		+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first
successful PANA-Bind-Request.		successful PANA-Bind-Request.
* After successful PANA authentication:		* Authorized phase:
+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate		+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate
PANA-Bind-Request.		PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-PAA-Discover.
* In termination phase:		* In termination phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-PAA-Discover.
Skipping to change at page 23, line 23:
header corresponding to the device identifier type contained in		header corresponding to the device identifier type contained in
the AVP (check performed by PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP		the AVP (check performed by PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP
carries the PaC's device identifier in messages from PaC to PAA		carries the PaC's device identifier in messages from PaC to PAA
and EP(s)' device identifier in messages from PAA to PaC.		and EP(s)' device identifier in messages from PAA to PaC.
o When an IP-Address AVP is received in a message, the AVP is valid		o When an IP-Address AVP is received in a message, the AVP is valid
if the IP address matches the source address in the IP header.		if the IP address matches the source address in the IP header.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness		Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY		against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.7 for details.		be returned to the sender. See Section 5.10 for details.
5.6 PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is
not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is
produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP
authentications are performed in sequence in a single PANA
authentication phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived.
If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys.
When a new AAA-Key is derived as a result of EAP-based
re-authentication, any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be
updated to a new one that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order
to distinguish the new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be
carried in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at
the end of the EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new
AAA-Key. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a
value that uniquely identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session.
The PANA-Bind-Answer message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message) sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a
Key-Id AVP with the same AAA-Key identifier carried in the request.
PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry
a MAC AVP whose value is computed by using the new PANA-MAC-KEY
derived from the new AAA-Key (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the
PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from two AAA-Keys). Although the
specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of
Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically increasing
numbers.
The created PANA SA is deleted when the corresponding PANA session is
deleted. The lifetime of the PANA SA is the same as the lifetime of
the PANA session for simplicity.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below:
PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id
* Device-Id of PaC
* IP address of PaC (may be the same as the Device-Id of PaC)
* IP address of PAA
* List of device identifiers of EPs
* Sequence number of the last transmitted request
* Sequence number of the last received request
* Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval
* Session lifetime
* Protection-Capability
* PANA SA attributes:
+ Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
+ Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
+ AAA-Key
+ AAA-Key Identifier
+ PANA_MAC_KEY
The PANA_MAC_KEY is used to integrity protect PANA messages and
derived from AAA-Key(s). When two AAA-Keys (AAA-Key1 and AAA-Key2)
are generated as a result of double EAP authentication (see Section
4.2) the compound AAA-Key can be computed as follows ('|' indicates
concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of
HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in
use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of AAA-Key MUST be N bits
or longer. See Section Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the
PANA_MAC_KEY.
5.7 Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a
PANA-Error-Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a
request message (e.g., PANA-PAA-Discover or *-Request), then the
request MAY be retransmitted immediately without waiting for its
retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the error was a
response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request message
SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the next
request.
To defend against DoS attacks a timer MAY be used. One (1) error
notification is sent to each different sender each N seconds. N is a
configurable parameter.
When an error message is sent unprotected with a MAC AVP and the
lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an
informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST
NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session
is not making any progress.
5.8 Device ID Choice		5.6 Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP		The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that is not carried in data		address, a MAC address, or an identifier that is not carried in data
packets but has local significance in identifying a connected host		packets but has local significance in identifying a connected device
(e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of identifiers		(e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of identifiers
are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not		are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC addresses are not
available and lower-layers are already physically or		available and lower-layers are already physically or
cryptographically secured.		cryptographically secured.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security		It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (e.g.,		mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (e.g.,
based on physical security, link-layer ciphers enabled before or		based on physical security, link-layer ciphers enabled before or
after PANA, or IPsec). Based on that information, the PAA can decide		after PANA, or IPsec). Based on that information, the PAA can decide
what type of EP device id will be used when running PANA with the		what type of EP device id will be used when running PANA with the
client. When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the		client. When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the
choice of access control, the PAA SHOULD provide IP address(es) as		choice of access control, the PAA SHOULD provide IP address(es) as
EP(s)' device ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in		EP(s)' device ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in
return. In case IPsec is not used, MAC addresses are used as device		return. In case IPsec is not used, MAC addresses are used as device
IDs when available. If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a		IDs when available. If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a
MAC address is not available, device ID exchange does not occur		MAC address is not available, device ID exchange does not occur
within PANA. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers to provide		within PANA. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers to provide
locally-significant identifiers along with received PANA packets.		locally-significant identifiers along with received PANA packets.
5.9 Updating PaC' Address		5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,		A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in		the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA		which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA
address (POPA), and the PaC and PAA create host routes to each other		address (POPA), and the PaC and PAA create host routes to each other
in order to maintain on-link communication based on the POPA. The		in order to maintain on-link communication based on the POPA. The
PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.		PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a		After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a
PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The message MUST carry the		PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The message MUST carry the
new PaC address in an IP-Address AVP. If the address contained in		new PaC address in an IP-Address AVP. If the address contained in
the request is invalid, the PAA MUST send a PANA-Error message with		the request is invalid, the PAA MUST send a PANA-Error message with
the result code PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS. Otherwise, the PAA MUST		the result code PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS. Otherwise, the PAA MUST
update the PANA session with the new PaC address and return a		update the PANA session with the new PaC address and return a
PANA-Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both		PANA-Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both
PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected		PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP.		with a MAC AVP.
5.10 Session Lifetime		5.8 Session Lifetime
The authentication phase determines the PANA session lifetime when		The authentication phase determines the PANA session lifetime when
the network access authorization succeeds. The Session-Lifetime AVP		the network access authorization succeeds. The Session-Lifetime AVP
MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind-Request message to inform		MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind-Request message to inform
PaC about the valid lifetime of the PANA session. It MUST be ignored		PaC about the valid lifetime of the PANA session. It MUST be ignored
when included in other PANA messages. When there are multiple EAP		when included in other PANA messages.
authentication taking place, this AVP SHOULD be included after the
final authentication.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by PaC to		The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by PaC to
manage PANA-related state. PaC does not have to perform any actions		manage PANA-related state. PaC does not have to perform any actions
when the lifetime expires, other than optionally purging local state.		when the lifetime expires, other than optionally purging local state.
PAA SHOULD initiate EAP authentication before the current session		PAA SHOULD initiate EAP authentication before the current session
lifetime expires.		lifetime expires.
PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to		PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to
expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and		expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and
reliability of such indications depend on the specific access		reliability of such indications depend on the specific access
technologies. PANA peer can use PANA-Ping-Request message to verify		technologies. PANA peer can use PANA-Ping-Request message to verify
the disconnection before taking an action.		the disconnection before taking an action.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of		The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
Skipping to change at page 27, line 20:
reliability of such indications depend on the specific access		reliability of such indications depend on the specific access
technologies. PANA peer can use PANA-Ping-Request message to verify		technologies. PANA peer can use PANA-Ping-Request message to verify
the disconnection before taking an action.		the disconnection before taking an action.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of		The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for		PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to		asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not require		send PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not require
coordination between the peers.		coordination between the peers.
5.11 Network Selection		When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
		that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
		two authentications. In this case, the smaller authorization
		lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA Session-Lifetime
		value. As a result, when entering a re-authentication phase, both
		NAP and ISP authentication will be performed in the same
		re-authentication phase.
		5.9 Network Selection
In a discovery and handshake phase, a PANA-Start-Request message sent		In a discovery and handshake phase, a PANA-Start-Request message sent
from the PAA MAY contain zero or one NAP-Information AVP and zero or		from the PAA MAY contain zero or one NAP-Information AVP and zero or
more ISP-Information AVPs to advertise the information on the NAP		more ISP-Information AVPs to advertise the information on the NAP
and/or ISPs. The PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an		and/or ISPs. The PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an
ISP-Information AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. When a AAA		ISP-Information AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. When a AAA
backend is used, the identity of the destination AAA server or realm		backend is used, the identity of the destination AAA server or realm
MUST be determined based on the explicitly chosen ISP. When the		MUST be determined based on the explicitly chosen ISP. When the
ISP-Information AVP is not present, the access network MAY rely on		ISP-Information AVP is not present, the access network MAY rely on
the client identifier carried in the EAP authentication method to		the client identifier carried in the EAP authentication method to
make this determination. The PaC can choose an ISP and contain an		make this determination. The PaC can choose an ISP and contain an
ISP-Information AVP for the chosen ISP in a PANA-Start-Answer message		ISP-Information AVP for the chosen ISP in a PANA-Start-Answer message
even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the		even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the
PANA-Start-Request message.		PANA-Start-Request message.
5.12 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication		5.10 Error Handling
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in an
authentication phase to support separate NAP and ISP authentication
as described in next sections. Currently, running multiple EAP
sessions in sequence in an authentication phase is designed only for
separate NAP and ISP authentication. It is not for running arbitrary
number of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance
to try another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and
ISP authentication when an EAP authentication method fails. Within
separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication and the
ISP authentication are considered completely independent. Presence
or success of one should not effect the other. Making a network
access authorization decision based on the success or failure of each
authentication is a network policy issue.
5.12.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.1
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY enable separate NAP
and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana-framework]) by setting the
S-flag of the message header of the PANA-Start-Request.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is not set,
the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message sent
back to the PAA.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message. If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set,
only one authentication is performed and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.1. If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message is set, the determination of the destination AAA server or
realm for ISP authentication is performed as described in Section
5.11. In addition, where backend AAA servers are used for NAP
authentication, the NAP is considered the ultimate AAA realm, and the
destination AAA server for this authentication is determined entirely
by the local configuration on the access server hosting the PAA
(NAS).
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request message.
(If the initial EAP Request were contained in the PANA-Start-Request
message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC cannot tell whether
the EAP Request is for NAP authentication or ISP authentication.)
5.12.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.2
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set.
o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message as well as a
PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request
message MUST be used at the end of the first EAP authentication
and the PANA-Bind-Request MUST be used for the second EAP
authentication. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be
acknowledged with a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message.
o If the first EAP authentication has failed, the PAA can choose not
to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing the S-flag of
the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. In this case, the S-flag
of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message sent by the PaC MUST be
cleared. If the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message
is set when the first EAP authentication has failed, the PaC can
choose not to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing
the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations,
the PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the
second EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
5.12.3 AAA-Key Calculation
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the
lower-layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in
the separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In
this case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as
well as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second
EAP authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the
AAA-Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged
in authorized phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase
MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentications succeed.
5.12.4 Re-authentication
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two authentications. In this case, the smaller authorization
lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA Session-Lifetime
value. As a result, when entering a re-authentication phase, both
NAP and ISP authentication will be performed in the same
re-authentication phase.
5.12.5 Example Sequence
A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is
illustrated in Figure 9. The example assumes the following scenario:
o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase.
o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a
choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer
from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP.
o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this
order in authentication phase.
o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in
each EAP sequence.
o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and
replay protected with MAC AVPs.
o Authorization, re-authentication and termination phases are not
shown.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
-----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set
[Nonce, Cookie,
ISP-Information("ISP1"),
ISP-Information("ISP2"),
NAP-Information("MyNAP")]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set
[Nonce, Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1"
ISP-Information("ISP1")]
// Authentication phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] // S- and N-flags set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id] // No piggybacking
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id] // S- and N-flags set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] // Piggybacking
<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3) // S- and N-flags set
[Session-Id, Key-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] // S-flag set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, MAC] // No piggybacking
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] // Piggybacking
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
IP-Address, Key-Id, Lifetime,
Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6) // S-flag set
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
PPAC, MAC]
Figure 9: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication
6. Security and Mobility
6.1 PANA Security Association Establishment
When PANA is used over an already established secure channel, such as
physically secured wires or ciphered link-layers, we can reasonably
assume that man-in-the-middle attacks or service theft is not
possible. See [I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval] for a detailed
discussion.
In environments where no secure channel prior to the PANA execution		A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
is available, PANA needs to protect itself against a number of		when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
attacks. The device identifier that is used during the		errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a
authentication needs to be verified at the end of the authentication		PANA-Error-Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a
to prevent service theft and DoS attacks. Additionally, a free		request message (e.g., PANA-PAA-Discover or *-Request), then the
loader should be prevented from spoofing data packets by using the		request MAY be retransmitted immediately without waiting for its
device identifier of an already authorized legitimate client. Both		retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the error was a
of these requirements necessitate generation of a security		response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request message
association between the PaC and the PAA at the end of the		SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the next
authentication. This can only be done when the authentication method		request.
used can generate session keys. Use of session keys can prevent
attacks which would otherwise be very easy to launch by eavesdropping
on and spoofing traffic over an insecure link.
The EAP method provided session key is transported to the PAA (if		Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adverseries to launch DoS
necessary) and is subsequently input to the creation of the PANA SA.		attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the
Applying the PANA SA to the messages exchanged during the final PANA		generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by
handshake provides implicit key confirmation to both the PAA and the		having tp respond to bogus packets. Limiting the number of error
PaC. Implicit key confirmation shows both, the PaC and the PAA, that		notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of
they possess the unique and fresh session key.		time may be useful.
Protecting the final PANA handshake also ensures that the device		When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the
identifier (and other information) cannot be modified by an		lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an
adversary. Further usage of the keying material is discussed in		informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework].		NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session
		is not making any progress.
6.2 Mobility		6. Mobility
A mobile PaC's network access authentication performance can be		A mobile PaC's network access authentication performance can be
enhanced by deploying a context-transfer-based mechanism, where some		enhanced by deploying a context-transfer-based mechanism, where some
session attributes are transferred from the previous PAA to the new		session attributes are transferred from the previous PAA to the new
one in order to avoid performing a full EAP authentication (reactive		one in order to avoid performing a full EAP authentication (reactive
approach). Additional mechanisms that are based on the proactive AAA		approach). Additional mechanisms that are based on the proactive AAA
state establishment at one or more candidate PAAs may be developed in		state establishment at one or more candidate PAAs may be developed in
the future [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]. The details of a		the future [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]. The details of a
context-transfer-based mechanism is provided in this section.		context-transfer-based mechanism is provided in this section.
Skipping to change at page 33, line 20:
the mobility optimization. In the absence of a Session-Id AVP in		the mobility optimization. In the absence of a Session-Id AVP in
this message, the PANA session takes its usual course (i.e.,		this message, the PANA session takes its usual course (i.e.,
EAP-based authentication is performed).		EAP-based authentication is performed).
If a PAA receives a session identifier in the PANA-Start-Answer		If a PAA receives a session identifier in the PANA-Start-Answer
message, and it is configured to enable this optimization, it SHOULD		message, and it is configured to enable this optimization, it SHOULD
retrieve the PANA session attributes from the previous PAA. Current		retrieve the PANA session attributes from the previous PAA. Current
PAA determines the identity of the previous PAA by looking at the		PAA determines the identity of the previous PAA by looking at the
DiameterIdentity part of the PANA session identifier. The MAC AVP		DiameterIdentity part of the PANA session identifier. The MAC AVP
can only be verified by the previous PAA, therefore a copy of the		can only be verified by the previous PAA, therefore a copy of the
PANA message SHOULD be provided to the previous PAA. The mechanism		PANA message MUST be provided to the previous PAA. The mechanism
required to send a copy of the PANA-Start-Answer message from current		required to send a copy of the PANA-Start-Answer message from current
PAA to the previous PAA, and retrieve the session attributes is		PAA to the previous PAA, and retrieve the session attributes is
outside the scope of PANA protocol. The Context Transfer Protocol		outside the scope of PANA protocol. The Context Transfer Protocol
[I-D.ietf-seamoby-ctp] might be useful for this purpose.		[I-D.ietf-seamoby-ctp] might be useful for this purpose.
When the previous or current PAA is not configured to enable this		When the previous or current PAA is not configured to enable this
optimization, the current PAA can not retrieve the PANA session		optimization, the current PAA can not retrieve the PANA session
attributes, or the PANA session has already expired (i.e., session		attributes, or the PANA session has already expired (i.e., session
lifetime is zero), the PAA MUST send the PANA-Auth-Request message		lifetime is zero), the PAA MUST send the PANA-Auth-Request message
with a new session identifier and let the PANA exchange take its		with a new session identifier and let the PANA exchange take its
Skipping to change at page 34, line 9:
current PAA. Session-ID is the identifier of the PaC's PANA session		current PAA. Session-ID is the identifier of the PaC's PANA session
with the previous PAA.		with the previous PAA.
The current PAA and PaC compute the new AAA-Key by using the nonce		The current PAA and PaC compute the new AAA-Key by using the nonce
values and the AAA-Key-int.		values and the AAA-Key-int.
AAA-Key-new = The first N bits of		AAA-Key-new = The first N bits of
HMAC-SHA1(AAA-Key-int, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce)		HMAC-SHA1(AAA-Key-int, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce)
New PANA_MAC_KEY is computed based on the algorithm described in		New PANA_MAC_KEY is computed based on the algorithm described in
Section 5.6, by using the new AAA-Key and the new Session-ID assigned		Section 5.3, by using the new AAA-Key and the new Session-ID assigned
by the current PAA. The MAC AVP contained in the PANA-Bind-Request		by the current PAA. The MAC AVP contained in the PANA-Bind-Request
and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be generated and verified by using		and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be generated and verified by using
the new PANA_MAC_KEY. The Session-ID AVP MUST include a new session		the new PANA_MAC_KEY. The Session-ID AVP MUST include a new session
identifier assigned by the current PAA. A new PANA session is		identifier assigned by the current PAA. A new PANA session is
created upon successful completion of this exchange.		created upon successful completion of this exchange.
Note that correct operation of this optimization relies on many		Note that correct operation of this optimization relies on many
factors, including applicability of authorization state from one		factors, including applicability of authorization state from one
network attachment to another. [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] identifies this		network attachment to another. [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] identifies this
operation as "fast handoff" and provides deployment considerations.		operation as "fast handoff" and provides deployment considerations.
Skipping to change at page 35, line 15:
7. PANA Headers and Formats		7. PANA Headers and Formats
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.		This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
7.1 IP and UDP Headers		7.1 IP and UDP Headers
The Hop Limit (or TTL) field of the IP header MUST be set to 255.		The Hop Limit (or TTL) field of the IP header MUST be set to 255.
When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address		When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address
of the message is set to a well-known link-local multicast address		of the message is set to a well-known link-local multicast address
(TBD). A PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast in some cases as		(TBD). A PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast in some cases as
specified in Section 4.1. Any other PANA packet is unicast between		specified in Section 4.2. Any other PANA packet is unicast between
the PaC and the PAA. The source and destination addresses SHOULD be		the PaC and the PAA. The source and destination addresses SHOULD be
set to the addresses on the interfaces from which the message will be		set to the addresses on the interfaces from which the message will be
sent and received, respectively.		sent and received, respectively.
When the PANA packet is sent in response to a request, the UDP source		When the PANA packet is sent in response to a request, the UDP source
and destination ports of the response packet MUST be copied from the		and destination ports of the response packet MUST be copied from the
destination and source ports of the request packet, respectively.		destination and source ports of the request packet, respectively.
The destination port of an unsolicited PANA packet MUST be set to an		The destination port of an unsolicited PANA packet MUST be set to an
assigned value (TBD), and the source port MUST be set to a value		assigned value (TBD), and the source port MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender.		chosen by the sender.
Skipping to change at page 37, line 8:
authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a		authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a
PANA-Auth-Request message, it indicates that the current EAP		PANA-Auth-Request message, it indicates that the current EAP
authentication is for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy		authentication is for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy
the value of the flag in its requests from the last received		the value of the flag in its requests from the last received
request of the PAA. The value of the flag on an answer MUST be		request of the PAA. The value of the flag on an answer MUST be
copied from the request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when		copied from the request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when
S-flag is not set.		S-flag is not set.
r(eserved)		r(eserved)
these flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to		These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.		zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type		Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to		The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address		communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address		space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address
space for this field.		space for this field.
Sequence Number		Sequence Number
Skipping to change at page 40, line 9:
Data		Data
The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information		The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data		specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.		field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
8. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs		8. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs
8.1 PANA Messages		8.1 PANA Messages
Figure 10 lists all PANA messages defined in this document.		Figure 9 lists all PANA messages defined in this document.
Message Direction: PaC---PAA		Message Direction: PaC---PAA
----------------------------------------		----------------------------------------
PANA-PAA-Discover -------->		PANA-PAA-Discover -------->
PANA-Start-Request <--------		PANA-Start-Request <--------
PANA-Start-Answer -------->		PANA-Start-Answer -------->
PANA-Auth-Request <------->		PANA-Auth-Request <------->
PANA-Auth-Answer <------->		PANA-Auth-Answer <------->
Skipping to change at page 40, line 42:
PANA-Termination-Request <------->		PANA-Termination-Request <------->
PANA-Termination-Answer <------->		PANA-Termination-Answer <------->
PANA-Update-Request -------->		PANA-Update-Request -------->
PANA-Update-Answer <--------		PANA-Update-Answer <--------
PANA-Error-Request <------->		PANA-Error-Request <------->
PANA-Error-Answer <------->		PANA-Error-Answer <------->
Figure 10: PANA Message Overview		Figure 9: PANA Message Overview
8.2 Message Specifications		8.2 Message Specifications
Every PANA message MUST include a corresponding ABNF [RFC2234]		Every PANA message MUST include a corresponding ABNF [RFC2234]
specification found in [RFC3588].		specification found in [RFC3588].
Example:		Example:
message ::= < PANA-Header: <Message type>, [REQ] [SEP] >		message ::= < PANA-Header: <Message type>, [REQ] [SEP] >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
8.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)		8.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address		The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address
of PAA(s). Both sequence numbers in this message are set to zero		of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero
(0).		(0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >		PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
8.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR)		8.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
PANA-Start-Request (PSR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC. The PAA sets		PANA-Start-Request (PSR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to advertise
		availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The PAA sets
the sequence number to an initial random value.		the sequence number to an initial random value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [SEP] >		PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [SEP] >
{ Nonce }		{ Nonce }
[ Cookie ]		[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ]		[ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ]		* [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability]		[ Protection-Capability]
[ PPAC ]		[ PPAC ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
8.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)		8.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in response to		PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in response to
a PANA-Start-Request message.		a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the handshake
		to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [SEP] >		PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [SEP] >
{ Nonce }		{ Nonce }
[ Session-Id ]		[ Session-Id ]
[ Cookie ]		[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ]		[ ISP-Information ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)		8.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC.		PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) is either sent by the PAA or the PaC. Its
		main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >		PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload >		< EAP-Payload >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)		8.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in response to a		PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) is sent by either the PaC or the PAA in
PANA-Auth-Request message.		response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY optionally carry an
		EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [SEP] [NAP] >		PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload >		[ EAP-Payload ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)		8.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)
PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA.		PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA to
		re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >		PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)		8.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)
PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response		PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response
to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.		to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >		PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)		8.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC.		PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to deliver the
		result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >		PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }		{ Result-Code }
{ PPAC }		{ PPAC }
{ IP-Address }		{ IP-Address }
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ]		[ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ]		[ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
Skipping to change at page 43, line 29:
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }		{ Result-Code }
[ PPAC ]		[ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ]		[ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)		8.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) is either sent by the PaC or the PAA.		PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) is either sent by the PaC or the PAA for
		performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >		PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)		8.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) is sent in response to a PANA-Ping-Request.		PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) is sent in response to a PANA-Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >		PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)		8.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA.		PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA
		to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >		PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause >		< Termination-Cause >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)		8.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA in		PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA in
response to PANA-Termination-Request.		response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >		PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER)		8.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER)
PANA-Error is sent either by the PaC or the PAA.		PANA-Error is sent either by the PaC or the PAA to report an error
		with the last received PANA message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8 REQ >		PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8 REQ >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
< Result-Code >		< Result-Code >
{ Failed-AVP }		{ Failed-AVP }
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)		8.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
PANA-Error-Answer is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request.		PANA-Error-Answer is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >		PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)		8.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) is sent by the PAA to the PaC.		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
		signal the result of the first EAP authentication method when
		separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
{ EAP-Payload }		{ EAP-Payload }
{ Result-Code }		{ Result-Code }
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)		8.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
Skipping to change at page 45, line 21:
response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.		response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR)		8.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
PANA-Update-Request (PUR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA.		PANA-Update-Request (PUR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA to update the
		attributes of the PANA session. Currently only the PaC IP address
		attribute can be updated via this mechanism.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >		PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >
< Session-Id >		< Session-Id >
< IP-Address >		< IP-Address >
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC >		0*1 < MAC >
8.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)		8.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response to		PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response to
Skipping to change at page 46, line 45:
Protection-Cap. | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |		Protection-Cap. | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0-1 | 0 |		PPAC | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0-1 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |		Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0+ | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		ISP-Information | 0+ | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		NAP-Information | 0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 |		Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0-1 | 0 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+		--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (1/3)		Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/3)
+-------------------------------------+		+-------------------------------------+
| Message |		| Message |
| Type |		| Type |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Attribute Name | PPR | PPA | PTR | PTA | PFER | PFEA |		Attribute Name | PPR | PPA | PTR | PTA | PFER | PFEA |
--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |		Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |		Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |		EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Skipping to change at page 47, line 28:
Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0-1 |		Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-1 | 0-1 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Figure 12: AVP Occurrence Table (2/3)		Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/3)
+-------------------------------------+		+-------------------------------------+
| Message |		| Message |
| Type |		| Type |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Attribute Name | PUR | PUA | PER | PEA | PRAR | PRAA |		Attribute Name | PUR | PUA | PER | PEA | PRAR | PRAA |
--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |		Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Skipping to change at page 48, line 28:
Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
IP-Address | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		IP-Address | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+		--------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+
Figure 13: AVP Occurrence Table (3/3)		Figure 12: AVP Occurrence Table (3/3)
8.3.1 MAC AVP		8.3.1 MAC AVP
The first octet (8 bits) of the MAC (AVP Code 1) AVP data contains		The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity
the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload contains the		protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 1)
MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm name space is		data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload
managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies depending on the		contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm
used algorithm.		name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies
		depending on the used algorithm.
0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | MAC...		| Algorithm | MAC...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Algorithm		Algorithm
1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes)		1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes)
MAC		MAC
The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order.		The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order.
8.3.2 Device-Id AVP		8.3.2 Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is of Address type [RFC3588]. IPv4		The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device
and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in [RFC3588]. The		identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
content and format of data (including byte and bit ordering) for		[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in specific		[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
documents that describe how IP operates over different link-layers.		ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that are		specific documents that describe how IP operates over different
defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this AVP.		link-layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than
		that are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for
		this AVP.
8.3.3 Session-Id AVP		8.3.3 Session-Id AVP
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a		All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 3) which carries a PAA-assigned fix value		Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 3) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
throughout the lifetime of a session. When present, the Session-Id		session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
SHOULD appear immediately following the PANA header.		present, the Session-Id SHOULD appear immediately following the PANA
		header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant		The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA Session without reference to any other		to identify a PANA Session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication		information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has		information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].		the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
8.3.4 Cookie AVP		8.3.4 Cookie AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 4) is of type OctetString. The data is		The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying a cookie value
		generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. It is
opaque and the exact content is outside the scope of this protocol.		opaque and the exact content is outside the scope of this protocol.
8.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP		8.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 5) is of type Unsigned32.		The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 5) indicates the
The AVP data indicates the cryptographic data protection capability		cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
supported by the EPs. Below is a list of specified data protection		the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
capabilities:		valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION		0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION		1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
8.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP		8.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type of type Enumerated,		The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for indicating the
and is used to indicate the reason why a session was terminated on		reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
the access device. The AVP data is used as a collection of flags The		of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
following Termination-Cause AVP defined in [RFC3588] are used for		used with PANA.
PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)		LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect		The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)		ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to		The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
administrative reasons, such as the receipt of a		administrative reasons, such as the receipt of a
Abort-Session-Request message.		Abort-Session-Request message.
Skipping to change at page 50, line 32:
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates		The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether		whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from		an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.		[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.
8.3.7.1 Authentication Results Codes		8.3.7.1 Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and		These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization		authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result that		result can be different as described below, but only one result is
corresponds to the one detected first is returned.		returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and
		PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001		PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both the authentication and authorization processes are		Both the authentication and authorization processes are
successful.		successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001		PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001
The authentication process failed. When this error is returned,		Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
the authorization process also fails.		assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003		PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003
The authorization process failed. This error could occur when		Authorization has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA proxy or rejected locally by a		authorization is rejected by a AAA proxy or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure succeeds.		PAA, even if the authentication has succeeded.
8.3.7.2 Protocol Error Result Codes		8.3.7.2 Protocol Error Result Codes
Protocol error result code values.		These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
		otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001		PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. Message type not		Message type not recognized or supported.
recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002		PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002
Error code from PAA to PaC. PAA was unable to deliver the EAP		PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the authentication
payload to the authentication server.		server. Only PAA can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008		PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. A message was		A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either
received whose bits in the PANA header were either set to an		set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent
invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent with the		with the message type definition.
message type's definition.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_BITS 3009		PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. A message was		A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are
received that included an AVP whose flag bits are set to an		set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the
unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the AVP's		AVP's definition.
definition.
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001		PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. The received		The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or
message contained an AVP that is not recognized or supported and		supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message
was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message with this error		with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing
MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing the AVPs that		the AVPs that caused the failure.
caused the failure.
PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002		PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. The message		The message contained an unknown Session-Id. PAA MUST NOT send
contained an unknown Session-Id. PAA MUST NOT send this error		this error result code value to PaC if PaC sent an unknown
result code value to PaC if PaC sent an unknown Session-Id in the		Session-Id in the PANA-Start-Answer message (session resumption).
PANA-Start-Answer message (session resumption).
PANA_INVALID_AVP_VALUE 5004		PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 5004
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. The message
contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data portion. A		The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data
PANA message indicating this error MUST include the offending AVPs		portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the
within a Failed-AVP AVP.		offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005		PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. The message did		The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message
not contain an AVP that is required by the message type		type definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a
definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a
Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP		Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the		AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the
Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP		Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP
should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.		should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.
PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006		PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006
Error code from PAA to PaC. A message was received that cannot be		A message was received that cannot be authorized because the
authorized because the client has already expended allowed		client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this
resources. An example of this error condition is a client that is		error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session
restricted to one PANA session and attempts to establish a second		and attempts to establish a second session. Only PAA can generate
session.		this code.
PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007		PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007
Error code from PAA to PaC. The PAA has detected AVPs in the		The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each
message that contradicted each other, and is not willing to		other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One
provide service to the client. One or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST		or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that
be present, containing the AVPs that contradicted each other.		contradicted each other. Only PAA can generate this code.
PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008		PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. A message was		A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The
received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The Failed-AVP AVP		Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the
MUST be included and contain a copy of the offending AVP.		offending AVP.
PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009		PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. A message was		A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
received that included an AVP that appeared more often than		often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP
permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP AVP MUST be		AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of
included and contain a copy of the first instance of the offending		the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011		PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. This error is		This error is returned when a message was received, whose version
returned when a message was received, whose version number is		number is unsupported.
unsupported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012		PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012
This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified		This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified
reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP		reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP
pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP-Failure message		pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP-Failure message
to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in		to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in
PANA-Error-Request message.		PANA-Error-Request message.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014		PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. The message		The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The
contained an AVP with an invalid length. The PANA-Error message		PANA-Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the
indicating this error MUST include the offending AVPs within a		offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015		PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015
Error code from PAA to PaC or from PaC to PAA. This error is		This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid
returned when a message is received with an invalid message		message length.
length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016		PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016
Error code from PaC to PAA. This error is returned when the PaC		This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
receives a PANA-Bind-Request with a Protection-Capability AVP and		with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but does not
a valid MAC AVP but does not support the protection capability		support the protection capability specified in the
specified in the Protection-Capability AVP.		Protection-Capability AVP. Only PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017		PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
Error code from PaC to PAA. This error is returned in a		This error is returned in a PANA-Bind-Answer message when there is
PANA-Bind-Answer message when there is no match between the list		no match between the list of PPAC methods offered by the PAA and
of PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the		the ones available on the PaC. Only PaC can generate this code.
PaC.
PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 5018		PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 5018
Error code from PAA to PaC. This error is returned in a		This error is returned in a PANA-Error-Request message when the
PANA-Error-Request message when the IP-Address AVP in the received		IP-Address AVP in the received PANA-Update-Request message is
PANA-Update-Request message is invalid (e.g., a non-unicast		invalid (e.g., a non-unicast address). Only PAA can generate this
address).		code.
8.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP		8.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type OctetString and is used		The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 8) is used for encapsulating the actual
to encapsulate the actual EAP packet that is being exchanged between		EAP packet that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator.		authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP		8.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 9) data is of type Unsigned32. It		The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 9) contains the number of seconds
contains the number of seconds remaining before the current session		remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
is considered expired.		data is of type Unsigned32.
8.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP		8.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 10) is of type Grouped and provides		The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 10) provides debugging information in
debugging information in cases where a request is rejected or not		cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to
fully processed due to erroneous information in a specific AVP. The		erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].		Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].
8.3.11 NAP-Information AVP		8.3.11 NAP-Information AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 11) is of type Grouped, and		The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 11) contains zero or one
contains zero or one Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the		Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and
identifier of the NAP and one Provider-Name AVP which carries the		one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP
name of the NAP. Its Data field has the following ABNF grammar:		data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 11 >		NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 11 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }		0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }		{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
8.3.12 ISP-Information AVP		8.3.12 ISP-Information AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 12) is of type Grouped, and		The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 12) contains zero or one
contains zero or one Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the		Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and
identifier of the ISP and one Provider-Name AVP which carries the		one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP
name of the ISP. Its Data field has the following ABNF grammar:		data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 12 >		ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 12 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }		0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }		{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
8.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP		8.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and		The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise		contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
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contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.		contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
8.3.15 Key-Id AVP		8.3.15 Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Integer32, and contains an		The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and		AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session.		MUST be unique within the PANA session.
8.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP		8.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The data field of PPAC AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32. The		The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 16) is used for conveying the available types
AVP data is used to carry a set of flags which maps to various IP		of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
address configuration methods. When sent by the PAA, the AVP MUST		PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
have at least one of the flags set, and MAY have more than one set.		mechanisms is represented by a flag. At least one or more of the
When sent by the PaC, only one of the flags MUST be set.		flags MUST be set when sent by the PAA, and exactly one flag MUST be
		set when sent by the PaC. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows:		The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|D|A|T|I| Reserved |		|N|D|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags		PPAC Flags
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These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to		These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.		zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST configure a new IP address		Unless the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST configure a new IP address
using one of the methods indicated by the other flags. Refer to		using one of the methods indicated by the other flags. Refer to
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed discussion on when these		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed discussion on when these
methods can be used.		methods can be used.
8.3.17 Nonce AVP		8.3.17 Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 17) is of type OctetString. The data		The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 17) carries a randomly chosen value that is
contains a randomly generated value in opaque format. The data		used in cyrptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type
length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive.		OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque
		format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive.
8.3.18 IP-Address AVP		8.3.18 IP-Address AVP
The IP-Address (AVP Code 18) contains an IP address of n a PaC or		The IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 18) contains an IP address of the PaC or
PAA. The payload format of the IP-Address AVP is the same as that of		PAA. When it is sent by the PaC, it is used to convey the new IP
the Device-Id AVP (see See Section 8.3.2). Address families for IPv4		address of the PaC to the PAA when the PaC reconfigures its IP
or IPv6 MUST be used for this AVP. Address families for IPv4 or IPv6		address after the successful PANA authentication. This AVP is not
MUST be used for this AVP.		used if the PaC's IP address used during the PANA authentication
		phase is still valid. It is sent by the PAA in PANA-Bind-Request to
		bind the IP address of the PAA to the PANA session. The payload
		format of the IP-Address AVP is the same as that of the Device-Id AVP
		(see See Section 8.3.2). Address families for IPv4 or IPv6 MUST be
		used for this AVP.
9. PANA Protocol Message Retransmissions		9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover		The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover
and request messages.		and request messages.
The rule is that the sender of the request message retransmits the		The rule is that the sender of the request message retransmits the
request if the corresponding answer is not received in time. Answer		request if the corresponding answer is not received in time. Answer
messages are sent as answers to the request messages, not based on a		messages are sent as answers to the request messages, not based on a
timer.		timer.
PaC MUST retransmit PANA-PAA-Discover if a subsequent
PANA-Start-Request is not received in time. Even though a
PANA-Start-Request is received, PANA-PAA-Discover may still have to
be retransmitted. This is because a stateless PANA handshake
requires one time transmission of a PANA-Start-Request. PAA MUST NOT
start a timer and retransmit the request if it wants to avoid state
creation. If the received PANA-Start-Request included a Cookie AVP
(an indication of stateless handshake), PaC MUST retransmit
PANA-PAA-Discover until the first PANA-Auth-Request is received.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6		PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this		[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The		specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender		message exchange terminates when either the request sender
successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message		successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message
exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission		exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission
mechanism described below.		mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the		The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
following variables:		following variables:
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for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public		for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public
specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated		specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated
Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and		Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its		publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,		successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the		in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable.		request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
10.1 PANA UDP Port Number		10.1 PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 5.2, Section 4.1		PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 5.1, Section 4.2
and Section 7.1, which needs to be assigned by the IANA.		and Section 7.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
10.2 PANA Multicast Address		10.2 PANA Multicast Address
PANA uses one well-known IPv4 multicast address for which the scope		PANA uses one well-known IPv4 multicast address for which the scope
is limited to be link-local by setting the TTL field to 255, and one		is limited to be link-local by setting the TTL field to 255, and one
well-known IPv6 link-local scoped multicast address (Section 4.1 and		well-known IPv6 link-local scoped multicast address (Section 4.2 and
Section 7.1), which need to be assigned by the IANA.		Section 7.1), which need to be assigned by the IANA.
10.3 PANA Header		10.3 PANA Header
As defined in Section 7.2, the PANA header contains two fields that		As defined in Section 7.2, the PANA header contains two fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.		requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.
10.3.1 Message Type		10.3.1 Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values		The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
Skipping to change at page 64, line 21:
from the use of EAP and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748]. This		from the use of EAP and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748]. This
section provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are		section provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are
related to PANA framework and protocol design.		related to PANA framework and protocol design.
An important element in assessing security of PANA design and		An important element in assessing security of PANA design and
deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer (physical and		deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer (physical and
link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers		link-layer) security. In the context of this document, lower-layers
are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing		are said to be secure if they can prevent eavesdropping and spoofing
of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL		of packets. Examples of such networks are physically-secured DSL
networks and 3GPP2 networks with crytographically-secured cdma2000		networks and 3GPP2 networks with crytographically-secured cdma2000
link-layer.		link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled
		even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the
In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled even before		absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be
running the first PANA-based authentication. In the absence of such		created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer
a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be created in
conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer
cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).		cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
11.1 General Security Measures		11.1 General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.		PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
Since PaC and PAA are on the same IP link, a simple TTL check on the		Since PaC and PAA are on the same IP link, a simple TTL check on the
received PANA messages prevents off-link attacks.		received PANA messages prevents off-link attacks.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically		PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
Skipping to change at page 64, line 48:
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified		randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified
against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence		against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence
number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In		number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In
addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and		addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and
duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary		duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary
spoof messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it can		spoof messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it can
also eavesdrop to synchronize on the expected sequence number.		also eavesdrop to synchronize on the expected sequence number.
The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network		The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic		device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet. A set of filters can be used to discard		enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message that is		discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
received from the segment of the access network where only PaCs are		that is received from the segment of the access network where only
supposed to be connected.		PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to		The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic		PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported		session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported
by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating per-packet MAC to		by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating per-packet MAC to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP		protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP
message).		message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a		The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and		man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that		modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the MAC verification is silently discarded. The		fails to pass the MAC verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first		earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first
PANA-Bind-Request that signals a successful authentication is		PANA-Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request that signals a
generated. Starting with the PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer,		successful authentication is generated. Starting with these
any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn down can be		messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn
cryptographically protected.		down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of		The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures		the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.		there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is bounded by the AAA-authorized session		The lifetime of the PANA SA is bounded by the AAA-authorized session
lifetime with an additional tolerance period. Unless PANA state is		lifetime with an additional tolerance period. Unless PANA state is
updated by executing another EAP authentication, the PANA SA is		updated by executing another EAP authentication, the PANA SA is
removed when the current session expires.		removed when the current session expires.
Skipping to change at page 67, line 19:
Upon PaC's movement to a another PAA (new PAA) and request to perform		Upon PaC's movement to a another PAA (new PAA) and request to perform
a context transfer based optimization, the current PAA computes a		a context transfer based optimization, the current PAA computes a
AAA-Key-int based on the AAA-Key, ID of new PAA, and the session ID.		AAA-Key-int based on the AAA-Key, ID of new PAA, and the session ID.
This AAA-Key-int is delivered to the new PAA, and used in the		This AAA-Key-int is delivered to the new PAA, and used in the
computation of AAA-Key-new, which further takes a pair of nonce		computation of AAA-Key-new, which further takes a pair of nonce
values into account. After this point on, the AAA-Key-new becomes		values into account. After this point on, the AAA-Key-new becomes
the AAA-Key between the PaC and the new PAA.		the AAA-Key between the PaC and the new PAA.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is		When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a separate		enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a separate
master key is generated based on the AAA-Key, session ID, key ID, and		PaC-EP master key is generated based on the AAA-Key, session ID, key
EP ID.		ID, and EP ID.
The lifetime of this key is bounded by the lifetime of the PANA SA.		The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the
This key may be used with a secure association protocol		PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and		[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and
transient keys.		transient keys.
11.6 Per-packet Ciphering		11.6 Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running		Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon		PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows		successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a master key from AAA-Key for using with a per-packet		generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a
protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering		per-packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not readily useful		ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not
to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure association protocol		readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] may be needed to produce the required keying		association protocol [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] may be needed to produce
material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a cryptographic		the required keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish
binding between the data traffic generated by and for a client and		a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for
the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic must be		a client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity protected,		must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
and optionally encrypted.		protected, and optionally encrypted.
11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication		11.7 PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3		The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the the PAA and EP for		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the the PAA and EP for
provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange		provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange
MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for		MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for
authentication, integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be		authentication, integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be
privacy-protected when per-PaC master key for per-packet ciphering is		privacy-protected when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is
transmitted to the EP.		transmitted to the EP.
The per-packet ciphering master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP		The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
pair. The session ID and EP's device ID are taken into computation		session ID and EP's device ID are taken into computation for
for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. Compromise of an EP		achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. Compromise of an EP
does not automatically lead to compromise of another EP or the PAA.		does not automatically lead to compromise of another EP or the PAA.
11.8 Livenes Test		11.8 Livenes Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is		A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP		terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a		authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its lifetime expires. A		disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.		disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time		A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful		and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is		round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive. This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the		alive. This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the
peer might have disconnected (e.g., after discontinuation of data		peer might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data
traffic). Periodic use of this exchange as a keep-alive requires		traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this
additional care as it might result in congestion and hence false		exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care as it might result
alarms. This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA		in congestion and hence false alarms. This exchange is
is available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of		cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is available in order to
this functionality.		prevent threats associated with the abuse of this functionality.
11.9 Mobility Optimization		11.9 Mobility Optimization
The mobility optimization described in Section 4.12 involves the		The mobility optimization described in Section 6 involves the
previous PAA providing a AAA-Key to the current PAA of the PaC.		previous PAA (holding AAA-Key) providing a AAA-Key-new to the current
There are security risks stemming from potential compromise of PAAs.		PAA of the PaC. There are security risks stemming from potential
Compromise of the current PAA does not yield compromise of the		compromise of PAAs. Compromise of the current PAA does not yield
previous PAA, as AAA-Key cannot be computed from a compromised		compromise of the previous PAA, as AAA-Key cannot be computed from a
AAA-Key-new. But a compromised previous PAA along with the		compromised AAA-Key-new. But a compromised previous PAA along with
intercepted nonce values on the current link leads to the compromise		the intercepted nonce values on the current link leads to the
of AAA-Key-new. Operators should be aware of the potential risk of		compromise of AAA-Key-new. Operators should be aware of the
using this optimization. An operator can reduce the risk exposure by		potential risk of using this optimization.
forcing the PaC to perform an EAP-based authentication immediately
after the PaC gains access to new link via the optimized PANA		An operator can reduce the risk exposure by forcing the PaC to
execution.		perform an EAP-based authentication immediately after the PaC gains
		access to new link via the optimized PANA execution. EAP-based
		authentication can be run in parallel with IP data packet
		transmission.
11.10 Updating PaC's IP Address		11.10 Updating PaC's IP Address
Even though the IP-Address AVP in a PANA-Update-Request can be		Even though the IP-Address AVP in a PANA-Update-Request can be
cryptographically protected by the MAC AVP, there is not way to prove		cryptographically protected by the MAC AVP, there is not way to prove
the ownership of the IP address presented by the PaC. Hence an		the ownership of the IP address presented by the PaC. Hence an
authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by spoofing a victim's IP		authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by spoofing a victim's IP
address.		address.
11.11 Early Termination of a Session		11.11 Early Termination of a Session
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The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA		The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.		to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure		This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message		and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.		is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments		12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien		We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik		Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik
Nordmark and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable		Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo
comments to this document.		and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments
		to this document.
13. References		13. References
13.1 Normative References		13.1 Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC		[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
2131, March 1997.		2131, March 1997.
Skipping to change at page 71, line 44:
[RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S. and V. Gupta, "Dynamic		[RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S. and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of		Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.		IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.		[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC		Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.		3748, June 2004.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]		[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key		Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-03 (work in		Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-04 (work in
progress), July 2004.		progress), November 2004.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.		October 1998.
13.2 Informative References		13.2 Informative References
[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements]		[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements]
Yegin, A. and Y. Ohba, "Protocol for Carrying		Yegin, A. and Y. Ohba, "Protocol for Carrying
Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Requirements",		Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Requirements",
Skipping to change at page 72, line 34:
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-04 (work in progress),		Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-04 (work in progress),
September 2004.		September 2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework]		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",		Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-02 (work in progress), September		draft-ietf-pana-framework-02 (work in progress), September
2004.		2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., Ohba, Y. and J. Bournelle, "SNMP usage for		Mghazli, Y., Ohba, Y. and J. Bournelle, "SNMP usage for
PAA-2-EP interface", draft-ietf-pana-snmp-01 (work in		PAA-2-EP interface", draft-ietf-pana-snmp-02 (work in
progress), July 2004.		progress), October 2004.
[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]		[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]
Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Experimental Handoff Extension		Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Experimental Handoff Extension
to RADIUS", draft-irtf-aaaarch-handoff-04 (work in		to RADIUS", draft-irtf-aaaarch-handoff-04 (work in
progress), November 2003.		progress), November 2003.
[I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]		[I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]
Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N. and Y. Ohba,		Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N. and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol		"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator",		(EAP) Peer and Authenticator",
Skipping to change at page 75, line 5:
Alper E. Yegin		Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology		Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
75 West Plumeria Drive		75 West Plumeria Drive
San Jose, CA 95134		San Jose, CA 95134
USA		USA
Phone: +1 408 544 5656		Phone: +1 408 544 5656
EMail: alper.yegin@samsung.com		EMail: alper.yegin@samsung.com
		Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
		A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is
		illustrated in Figure 13. The example assumes the following
		scenario:
		o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase.
		o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a
		choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer
		from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP.
		o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this
		order in authentication phase.
		o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in
		each EAP sequence.
		o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and
		replay protected with MAC AVPs.
		o Authorization, re-authentication and termination phases are not
		shown.
		PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
		-----------------------------------------------------
		// Discovery and handshake phase
		-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
		<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set
		[Nonce, Cookie,
		ISP-Information("ISP1"),
		ISP-Information("ISP2"),
		NAP-Information("MyNAP")]
		-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set
		[Nonce, Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1"
		ISP-Information("ISP1")]
		// Authentication phase
		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication
		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] // S- and N-flags set
		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id] // No piggybacking
		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id] // S- and N-flags set
		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] // Piggybacking
		<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, MAC]
		-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3) // S- and N-flags set
		[Session-Id, Key-Id, MAC]
		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication
		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] // S-flag set
		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, MAC] // No piggybacking
		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, MAC]
		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] // Piggybacking
		<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
		IP-Address, Key-Id, Lifetime,
		Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6) // S-flag set
		[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
		PPAC, MAC]
		Figure 13: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP
		Authentication
Intellectual Property Statement		Intellectual Property Statement
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Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to		Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in		pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights		this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has		might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information		made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be		on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.		found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.