draft-ietf-pana-pana-07c.txt draft-ietf-pana-pana-07d.txt
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: June 15, 2005 Y. Ohba (Ed.) Expires: June 24, 2005 Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba Toshiba
B. Patil B. Patil
Nokia Nokia
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
A. Yegin A. Yegin
Samsung Samsung
December 15, 2004 December 24, 2004
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-07c draft-ietf-pana-pana-07d
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668. RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 15, 2005. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2005.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
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6.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.1 IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6.3 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs . . . . . . . 38 7. PANA Messages, Message Specifications and AVPs . . . . . . . 38
7.1 PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.1 PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . 44 7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.3 AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 7.3 AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.3.1 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.3.1 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.3.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3.2 Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.3.3 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3.3 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3.4 Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3.4 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.3.5 IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.3.6 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3.7 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.3.7 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 7.3.8 MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.9 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.10 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.11 NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.11 Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3.12 ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.12 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . 51
7.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.13 Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.14 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7.3.14 Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.15 Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 7.3.15 Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . 54 7.3.16 Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.3.17 Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 7.3.17 Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.3.18 IP-Address AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 7.3.18 Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 7.3.19 Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 57 8. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 59
9.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.1 PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.2 PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.3 PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 9.3.1 Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 9.3.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 9.4 AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.4.1 AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.5 AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.4.2 Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.5 AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.5.2 Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.5.3 Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 63
9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 9.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.5.5 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 62 9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 9.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.1 General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.2 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 10.1 General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.3 EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.2 Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.3 EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.5 Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.6 Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.5 Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10.6 Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.8 Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.7 PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.8 Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10.10 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11. Open Issues and Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 10.10 Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 12.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
13.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 12.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 75 A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . 75
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 77 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 77
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
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procedure can, according to the EAP model, be also offloaded to procedure can, according to the EAP model, be also offloaded to
the backend AAA infrastructure. the backend AAA infrastructure.
PANA Session: PANA Session:
A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client
(PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a (PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a
result of an authentication failure, a timeout, or an explicit result of an authentication failure, a timeout, or an explicit
termination message. A fixed session identifier is maintained termination message. A fixed session identifier is maintained
throughout a session. A session cannot be shared across multiple throughout a session. A session cannot be shared across multiple
network interfaces. network interfaces. Only one device identifier of the PaC is
allowed to be bound to a PANA session for simplicity.
Session Identifier: Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it
cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA
messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This
bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the
handshake and freed when the session terminates. handshake and freed when the session terminates.
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3. Protocol Overview 3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service. access service.
The protocol messaging consists of a series of request and responses, The protocol messaging consists of a series of request and responses,
some of which may be initiated by either ends. Each message can some of which may be initiated by either ends. Each message can
carry zero or more AVPs as payload. The main payload of PANA is EAP carry zero or more AVPs as payload. The main payload of PANA is EAP
which performs authentication. PANA helps PaC and PAA establish an which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA establish
EAP session. an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages. mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between a PaC and PAA as part of a PANA PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases: session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a
new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either
explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving
unsolicited advertisements. The PaC's answer sent in response to unsolicited advertisements. The PaC's answer sent in response to
an advertisement starts a new session. an advertisement starts a new session.
o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the
discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA
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-----> PANA-Bind-Answer -----> PANA-Bind-Answer
// Access phase (IP data traffic allowed) // Access phase (IP data traffic allowed)
<----- PANA-Ping-Request <----- PANA-Ping-Request
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer -----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase // Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request -----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer <----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA Messages in a Session Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated. flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated.
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generating per-message authentication codes that provide SA helps generating per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication. integrity protection and authentication.
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session. session.
4.1 Payload Encoding 4.1 Payload Encoding
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these (Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document. the document.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by a PAA and o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
used for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource and used for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource
consumption DoS attacks. consumption DoS attacks.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication. mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
an IP address) of the PaC or an EP. an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU. o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
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o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication. used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value that is used in
cyrptographic key computations. cyrptographic key computations.
o IP-Address AVP: contains an IP Address of the PaC. o IP-Address AVP: contains an IP Address of the PaC.
o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase 4.2 Discovery and Handshake Phase
When a PaC attaches to a network, and knows that it has to discover a When a PaC attaches to a network, and knows that it has to discover a
PAA, it SHOULD send a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known link PAA, it SHOULD send a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known link
local multicast address (TBD) and UDP port (TBD). The PAA discovery local multicast address (TBD) and UDP port (TBD). The PAA discovery
assumes that the PaC and the PAA are one IP hop away from each other. assumes that the PaC and the PAA are one IP hop away from each other.
If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA (based on If the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA (based on
pre-configuration), it MAY unicast the PANA-PAA-Discover message to pre-configuration), it MAY unicast the PANA-PAA-Discover message to
that address. that address.
When the PAA receives a PANA-PAA-Discover message from a PaC, the PAA When the PAA receives a PANA-PAA-Discover message from a PaC, the PAA
SHOULD unicast a PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC. SHOULD unicast a PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC.
The PaC MAY also choose to start sending data packets before getting The PaC MAY also choose to start sending data packets before getting
authenticated. The EP in an access network that implements PANA authenticated. The EP in an access network that implements PANA
SHOULD drop unauthorized packets upon receipt. Additionally, the EP SHOULD drop unauthorized packets upon receipt. Additionally, the EP
MAY also take this traffic as an indication of unauthorized PaC and MAY also take this traffic as an indication of unauthorized PaC and
notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA notification SHOULD be sent via notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA notification SHOULD be sent via
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In response, the PAA SHOULD send an [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In response, the PAA SHOULD send an
unsolicited PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC. This is called unsolicited PANA-Start-Request message to the PaC. This is called
"traffic-driven PAA discovery" (an alternative to PaC explicitly "traffic-driven PAA discovery" (an alternative to the PaC explicitly
soliciting for PAA). Note that this optional feature MAY NOT be soliciting for a PAA). Note that this optional feature MAY NOT be
present in all deployments, therefore PaCs MUST NOT assume its present in all deployments, therefore the PaC MUST NOT assume its
availability. The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in availability. The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in
response to receiving a link-up event notification on the EP response to receiving a link-up event notification on the EP
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]. [I-D.ietf-dna-link-information].
When a PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase. authentication and authorization phase.
There can be multiple PAAs on the link and a PaC may receive multiple There can be multiple PAAs on the link and the PaC may receive
PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The authentication and multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The
authorization result does not depend on which PAA is chosen by the authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA
PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that sent the first is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that
response. sent the first response.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a
random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to
as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA
can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the
same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that, same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that,
the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require
any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the
cookie returned in a PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery
that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery". that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery".
The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies
does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here. An does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here. An
example algorithm is described below. example algorithm is described below.
Cookie = Cookie =
<secret-version> | HMAC_SHA1( <Device-Id of PaC> , <secret> ) <secret-version> | HMAC_SHA1( <Device-Id of PaC> , <secret> )
where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the PAA, where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the PAA,
<secret-version> is an index used for choosing the secret for <secret-version> is an index used for choosing the secret for
  Skipping to change at page 13, line 41:
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a
PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a PANA-Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request. Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie has the expected value. If the computed cookie is received cookie has the expected value. If the computed cookie is
valid, the protocol enters the authentication and authorization valid, the protocol enters the authentication and authorization
phase. Otherwise, it MUST silently discard the received message. phase. Otherwise, it MUST silently discard the received message.
Initial EAP Request MAY be optionally carried by the The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request) PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be
stateless since transmission of an EAP request creates a state at EAP stateless since transmission of an EAP Request message creates a
layer. See [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine] for more information on the state at EAP layer. See [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine] for more
EAP state machine and the allocation of state information in the information on the EAP state machine and the allocation of state
respective protocol steps. information in the respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration A Protection-Capability AVP and a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration
(PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order to
indicate required and available capabilities for the network access. indicate required and available capabilities for the network access.
These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability match
even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are even before the authentication takes place. Since these AVPs are
provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are
certain security risks involved in using the provided information. certain security risks involved in using the provided information.
See Section 10 for further discussion on this. See Section 10 for further discussion on this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the
PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried
in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
  Skipping to change at page 14, line 17:
provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are provided during the insecure discovery and handshake phase, there are
certain security risks involved in using the provided information. certain security risks involved in using the provided information.
See Section 10 for further discussion on this. See Section 10 for further discussion on this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the
PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried PANA-Start-Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried
in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA. in the PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the
authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is
pre-configured with PAAs IP address and the PANA-PAA-Discover message pre-configured with the IP address of the PAA and the
is unicast. PANA-PAA-Discover message is unicast.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in PANA-Start-Request and A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the PANA-Start-Request and
PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a fresh PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a fresh
PANA_MAC_KEY (see Section 5.3) which is a transient session key in PANA_MAC_KEY (see Section 5.3) which is a transient session key in
the EAP key hierarchy [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and is used only in the the EAP key hierarchy [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and is used only in the
PANA protocol. A Nonce AVP MUST be included in PANA-Start-Request PANA protocol. A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the
and PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are used to establish a PANA-Start-Request and PANA-Start-Answer messages. The nonces are
PANA SA. used to establish a PANA SA.
A PANA-Start-Request message of a stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead, retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead,
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover until it receives a the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it
PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start-Answer receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the
message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The PaC can PANA-Start-Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request
determine whether the PAA is using stateless discovery by the message. The PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless
presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request message MUST be discovery by the presence of Cookie AVP. The PANA-Start-Request
retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer message when stateful message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
PAA discovery is used. message when stateful PAA discovery is used.
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery
and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a
PANA-Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover PANA-Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover
message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently
discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it
has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., no has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e., no
Cookie AVP is included in the message) for the PaC. In this case the Cookie AVP is included in the message) for the PaC. In this case the
PAA will retransmit PANA-Start-Request based on a timer, if the PaC PAA will retransmit the PANA-Start-Request message based on a timer,
doesn't respond in time (message was lost for example). If the PAA if the PaC doesn't respond in time (the message was lost for
had sent a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for example). If the PAA had sent a PANA-Start-Request message without
the PaC (i.e., a Cookie AVP was included in the message), then it creating a state for the PaC (i.e., a Cookie AVP was included in the
SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message. message), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-Discover message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3 phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase that shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
is triggered by data traffic. traffic-driven PAA discovery.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0) -----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie] <----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie] -----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example Sequence for Discovery and Handshake Phase when Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when
PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by PaC PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC
PaC EP PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC EP PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger) ---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism ------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie] <------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie] ------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Nonce, Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and (continued to the authentication and
authorization phase) authorization phase)
Figure 3: Example Sequence for Discovery and Handshake when discovery Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
is triggered by data traffic traffic-driven PAA discovery
4.3 Authentication and Authorization Phase 4.3 Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages.
PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of
the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY
include the EAP Response. This optimization MAY not be used when it include the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used
takes time to generate the EAP-Response (due to, e.g., intervention when it takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to,
of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth-Anser message e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an
without piggybacking an EAP-Response can avoid unnecessary EAP-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message
retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another can avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request
optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/ message. Another optimization allows optionally carrying the first
Response in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in Section EAP Request/Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as
4.2. described in Section 4.2.
PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one
with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional
feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When
performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is
signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the
next. See Section 4.7 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and next. See Section 4.7 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and
ISP authentication. ISP authentication.
The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent from PAA to PaC. This message carries the final EAP message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the final
authentication result (whether it is the second EAP authentication EAP authentication result (whether it is the second EAP
result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the sole EAP authentication result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the
authentication result) and the result of PANA authentication. The sole EAP authentication result) and the result of PANA
PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged
PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example sequence with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example
in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate sequence in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate
authentication). authentication).
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from the discovery and handshake phase) (continued from the discovery and handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id] [Session-Id]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y) <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id] [Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP-Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, [Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, PPAC, MAC] [Session-Id, Device-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Figure 4: Example Sequence in Authentication and Authorization Phase Figure 4: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
(PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request, PANA-Bind-Request) and any subsequent message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message MUST contain a MAC AVP. message) and any subsequent message MUST contain a MAC AVP.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s), and also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s), and
the IP address of the PAA to the PANA SA. To achieve this, the the IP address of the PAA to the PANA SA. To achieve this, the
PANA-Bind-Request message MUST contain the device identifier in a PANA-Bind-Request message MUST contain the device identifier in a
Device-Id AVP for each EP if a Protection-Capability AVP is included Device-Id AVP for each EP if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
in the message. Otherwise, the message SHOULD contain the device in the message. Otherwise, the message SHOULD contain the device
identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP
address is used as the device identifier of the PaC. The address is used as the device identifier of the PaC. The
PANA-Bind-Request message MUST also contain the IP address of the PAA PANA-Bind-Request message MUST also contain the IP address of the PAA
  Skipping to change at page 17, line 22:
of device identifier as contained in the request. If the of device identifier as contained in the request. If the
PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a
Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the
request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a
PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer
message to terminate the session. The PANA-Bind-Request message with message to terminate the session. The PANA-Bind-Request message with
a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST also contain a Protection-Capability a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST also contain a Protection-Capability
AVP if link-layer or network-layer ciphering is enabled after the AVP if link-layer or network-layer ciphering is enabled after the
authentication and authorization phase. The PANA-Bind-Request authentication and authorization phase. The PANA-Bind-Request
message MAY also contain a Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if message MAY also contain a Protection-Capability AVP to indicate if
link-layer or network-layer ciphering should be initiated after PANA. link-layer or network-layer ciphering should be enabled after the
No link-layer or network-layer specific information is included in authentication and authorization phase. No link-layer or
the Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware network-layer specific information is included in the
of the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware of
protocol does not specify how the PANA SA and the the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA protocol
Protection-Capability AVP will be used to provide per-packet does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-Capability AVP
protection for data traffic. will be used to provide per-packet protection for data traffic.
Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS
result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC)
AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP
address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. The address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In
PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in order to indicate its choice of method this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer
when there is a match between the methods offered by the PAA and the message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a
methods available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods
send a PANA-Error-Request message with a available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED result code and terminate the PANA PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
session. result code and terminate the PANA session.
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be retransmitted PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be retransmitted
based on the retransmission rule described in Section 5.2. based on the retransmission rule described in Section 5.2.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP-Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When sending an EAP Failure message [I-D.ietf-eap-statemachine]. When
this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the this occurs, the PAA SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the
PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not PaC with using PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC SHOULD not
change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower change its state unless the error message is secured by PANA or
layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout lower-layer. In any case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a
on the PaC. timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP-Success message but network access authorization fails due to, EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a
PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
a AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when a AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
the EAP-Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), this case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the
PANA-Bind message exchange MUST be protected with a MAC AVP and carry PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected
a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA session MUST be deleted with a MAC AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The AAA-Key and the PANA
immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange. session MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message
exchange.
4.4 Access Phase 4.4 Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the Once the authentication and authorization phase or the
re-authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access re-authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access
to the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through EP to the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the
availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return
a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and
PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be protected with a MAC AVP when a PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be protected with a MAC AVP when a
PANA SA is available. PANA SA is available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
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of timers for this purpose. of timers for this purpose.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by
the PaC and the PAA respectively. the PaC and the PAA respectively.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 5: Example Sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 6: Example Sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.5 Re-authentication Phase 4.5 Re-authentication Phase
A PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted. re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When a PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the
PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC
with the matching identifier, it MUST first respond with a with the matching session identifier, it MUST first respond with a
PANA-Reauth-Answer, followed by a PANA-Auth-Request that starts a new PANA-Reauth-Answer message, followed by a PANA-Auth-Request that
EAP authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the session based on starts a new EAP authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the
the received Session-Id, it MUST respond with a PANA-Error-Request session, it MAY respond with a PANA-Error-Request message with a
with the error code PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. The PAA MUST terminate result code PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. Transmission of this error
the session once it receives a PANA-Error-Answer for the request is made optional in case this behavior is leveraged for a DoS
PANA-Error-Request. The PANA-Reauth-Request/Answer messages MUST attack on the PAA.
contain a MAC AVP when there is a PANA SA in order to avoid a denial
of service attack.
PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer to The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer
its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due to to its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due
packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA when to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA
they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. PaC MUST keep when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST
discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the
answer to its request. answer to its request.
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the
PaC to enter the re-authentication phase. PAA SHOULD initiate EAP PaC to enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate
re-authentication before the current session lifetime expires. EAP re-authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers. existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA,
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by
adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP-based adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication
authentication MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during
selected during the initial authentication. An example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase. An example sequence for
a re-authentication initiated by a PaC is shown in Figure 7. re-authentication phase initiated by the PaC is shown in Figure 7.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q) -----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q) <----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP-Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1) -----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP-Response <----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, MAC] [Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1) <----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Request}, MAC]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP-Response -----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC] [Session-Id, EAP{Response}, MAC]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2) <----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, Key-Id, [Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Device-Id, Key-Id,
IP-Address, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC] IP-Address, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, MAC]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2) -----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC] [Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, MAC]
Figure 7: Example Sequence for re-authentication initiated by PaC Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC
4.6 Termination Phase 4.6 Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
the PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures. indication and session revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA established between the PaC and When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
the PAA, all messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
protected with a MAC AVP. When the sender of the with a MAC AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
PANA-Termination-Request receives a valid acknowledgment, all states message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
maintained for the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately. the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs] PaC PAA Message(seqno)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC] -----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC] <----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, MAC]
Figure 8: Example Sequence for Session Termination Triggered by PaC Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.7 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and
ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network
access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the
ISP. This separation allows PaC to perform an additional ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional
authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the
NAP. NAP.
Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase is designed only for separate authentication and authorization phase is designed only for separate
NAP and ISP authentication. It is not for running arbitrary number NAP and ISP authentication. It is not for running arbitrary number
of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try
another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
authentication when an EAP authentication method fails. authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
  Skipping to change at page 21, line 44:
4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.7.1 Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.2 Section 4.2
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication
([I-D.ietf-pana-framework]) by setting the S-flag on the message ([I-D.ietf-pana-framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header
header of the PANA-Start-Request. of the PANA-Start-Request message.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is
not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message sent back to the PAA. message sent back to the PAA.
If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one
authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.2. described in Section 4.2.
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request message. EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request
(If the initial EAP Request were contained in the PANA-Start-Request message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the
message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC cannot tell whether PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC
the EAP Request is for NAP authentication or ISP authentication.) cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication
or ISP authentication.)
4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 4.7.2 Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.3 in Section 4.3
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set. be set.
  Skipping to change at page 23, line 35:
AAA-Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and AAA-Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged
in the access phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase in the access phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase
MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentications succeed. and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to
derive the AAA-Key.
5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules 5. Protocol Design Details and Processing Rules
5.1 Transport Layer 5.1 Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is TBD. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover are always is TBD. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover are always
unicast. PANA-PAA-Discover MAY be unicast when the PaC knows the IP unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast when the PaC
address of the PAA. knows the IP address of the PAA.
5.1.1 Fragmentation 5.1.1 Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed. needed.
5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission 5.2 Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages. of messages.
PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be used The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be
for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in a used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in
request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the
sequence number contained in the original packet. sequence number contained in the original packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by PaC and PAA The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
as they send their very first request messages. PANA-PAA-Discover PAA as they send their very first request messages.
message carries sequence number 0. PANA-PAA-Discover message carries sequence number 0.
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-PAA-Discover, expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-PAA-Discover,
PANA-Start-Request messages. PANA-Start-Request messages.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time. outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately). PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The initial discovery and handshake phase requires special handling. The initial discovery and handshake phase requires special handling.
PaC MUST retransmit PANA-PAA-Discover if a subsequent The PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message if a subsequent
PANA-Start-Request is not received in time. Even though a PANA-Start-Request message is not received in time. Even though a
PANA-Start-Request is received, PANA-PAA-Discover may still have to PANA-Start-Request message is received, the PANA-PAA-Discover message
be retransmitted. This is because a stateless PAA discovery requires may still have to be retransmitted. This is because stateless PAA
one time transmission of a solicited PANA-Start-Request. PAA MUST discovery requires one time transmission of a solicited
NOT start a timer and retransmit the request in order to avoid state PANA-Start-Request message. The PAA MUST NOT start a timer and
creation. If the received PANA-Start-Request included a Cookie AVP retransmit the request in order to avoid state creation. If the
(an indication of stateless discovery), PaC MUST retransmit received PANA-Start-Request message included a Cookie AVP (an
PANA-PAA-Discover until the first PANA-Auth-Request is received. indication of stateless discovery), the PaC MUST retransmit the
Otherwise, PaC can rely on PAA to retransmit the PANA-Start-Requests PANA-PAA-Discover message until the first PANA-Auth-Request message
as soon as PaC receives the first one (i.e., PaC can stop sending is received. Otherwise, the PaC can rely on the PAA to retransmit
PANA-PAA-Discover). the PANA-Start-Request message as soon as the PaC receives the first
one (i.e., the PaC can stop sending the PANA-PAA-Discover message).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 8 for default [RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 8 for default
timer and maximum retransmission count parameters. timer and maximum retransmission count parameters.
PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. Last transmitted The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests. The last
PANA answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer and transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
that generates a retransmission of the last request. When available, peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
a cached answer can be used instead of fully processing the available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch. the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer. retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
5.3 PANA Security Association 5.3 PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is
not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is
produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP
authentications are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication sessions are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication and
and authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived.
derived. If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys.
AAA-Keys. When a new AAA-Key is derived as a result of EAP-based When a new AAA-Key is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase,
re-authentication, any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be updated to a new one
updated to a new one that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order to distinguish the
to distinguish the new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried in
carried in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at
the end of the EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new the end of the EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new
AAA-Key. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a AAA-Key. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a
value that uniquely identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session. value that uniquely identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session.
The PANA-Bind-Answer message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer The PANA-Bind-Answer message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message) sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a message) sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a
Key-Id AVP with the same AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. Key-Id AVP with the same AAA-Key identifier carried in the request.
PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry
a MAC AVP whose value is computed by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY a MAC AVP whose value is computed by using the new PANA_MAC_KEY
derived from the new AAA-Key (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the derived from the new AAA-Key (or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the
PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from two AAA-Keys). Although the PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from two AAA-Keys). Although the
specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of
Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically increasing the Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically
numbers. increasing numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the lifetime granted by the The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the lifetime granted by the
authentication server (same as AAA-Key lifetime). The lifetime of authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime). The lifetime
the PANA SA (hence the PANA_MAC_KEY) is the same as the lifetime of of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_MAC_KEY) is the same as the lifetime
the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when the of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when the
corresponding PANA session is deleted. corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below: below:
PANA Session attributes: PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id * Session-Id
* Device-Id of PaC * Device-Id of PaC
  Skipping to change at page 27, line 15:
+ AAA-Key + AAA-Key
+ AAA-Key Identifier + AAA-Key Identifier
+ PANA_MAC_KEY + PANA_MAC_KEY
The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is The PANA_MAC_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is
used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one
AAA-Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one AAA-Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one
failed and one successful NAP and ISP separate authentication (see failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see
Section 4.7), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single Section 4.7), the PANA_MAC_KEY computation is based on that single
key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
following way ('|' indicates concatenation): following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2 AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way: The PANA_MAC_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of PANA_MAC_KEY = The first N bits of
HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID) HMAC_SHA1(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)
where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in where the value of N depends on the integrity protection algorithm in
use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of AAA-Key MUST be N bits use, i.e., N=160 for HMAC-SHA1. The length of the AAA-Key MUST be N
or longer. See Section Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the bits or longer. See Section Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of
PANA_MAC_KEY. the PANA_MAC_KEY.
5.4 Message Authentication Code 5.4 Message Authentication Code
A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP A PANA message can contain a MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP
for cryptographically protecting the message. for cryptographically protecting the message.
When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the When a MAC AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of the
MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way: MAC AVP is calculated by using the PANA_MAC_KEY in the following way:
MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU) MAC AVP value = PANA_MAC_PRF(PANA_MAC_KEY, PANA_PDU)
  Skipping to change at page 28, line 30:
invalid: invalid:
* In the discovery and handshake phase: * In the discovery and handshake phase:
+ PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request. + PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request.
+ PANA-Bind-Request. + PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Reauth-Request.
+ PANA-Error-Request.
* In the authentication and authorization phase: * In the authentication and authorization phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover. + PANA-PAA-Discover.
+ PANA-Update-Request. + PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid + PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid
PANA-Auth-Request. PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first + PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first
  Skipping to change at page 29, line 20:
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload. in the payload.
o Each AVP is decoded correctly. o Each AVP is decoded correctly.
o When a MAC AVP is included, the AVP value matches the MAC value o When a MAC AVP is included, the AVP value matches the MAC value
computed against the received message. computed against the received message.
o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device
identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed
by both PaC and PAA) and is the requested one (check performed by by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check
PAA only) and the device identifier value contained in the AVP performed by the PAA only) and the device identifier value
matches the value extracted from the lower-layer encapsulation contained in the AVP matches the value extracted from the
header corresponding to the device identifier type contained in lower-layer encapsulation header corresponding to the device
the AVP (check performed by PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP identifier type contained in the AVP (check performed by the PAA
carries the PaC's device identifier in messages from PaC to PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the device identifier of
and EP(s)' device identifier in messages from PAA to PaC. the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA and the device
identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA to the PaC.
o When an IP-Address AVP is received in a message, the AVP is valid o When an IP-Address AVP is received in a message, the AVP is valid
if the IP address matches the source address in the IP header. if the IP address matches the source address in the IP header.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.10 for details. be returned to the sender. See Section 5.10 for details.
5.6 Device ID Choice 5.6 Device ID Choice
  Skipping to change at page 30, line 9:
based on physical security, link-layer ciphers enabled before or based on physical security, link-layer ciphers enabled before or
after PANA, or IPsec). Based on that information, the PAA can decide after PANA, or IPsec). Based on that information, the PAA can decide
what type of EP device id will be used when running PANA with the what type of EP device id will be used when running PANA with the
client. When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the client. When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the
choice of access control, the PAA SHOULD provide IP address(es) as choice of access control, the PAA SHOULD provide IP address(es) as
EP(s)' device ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in EP(s)' device ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in
return. In case IPsec is not used, MAC addresses are used as device return. In case IPsec is not used, MAC addresses are used as device
IDs when available. If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a IDs when available. If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a
MAC address is not available, device ID exchange does not occur MAC address is not available, device ID exchange does not occur
within PANA. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers to provide within PANA. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers to provide
locally-significant identifiers along with received PANA packets. locally-significant identifiers along with received PANA messages.
5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address 5.7 PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example, A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA
address (POPA), and the PaC and PAA create host routes to each other address (POPA), and the PaC and PAA create host routes to each other
in order to maintain on-link communication based on the POPA. The in order to maintain on-link communication based on the POPA. The
PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC address. PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a After the PaC has changed its address, it MUST send a
PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The message MUST carry the PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The message MUST carry the
new PaC address in an IP-Address AVP. If the address contained in new PaC address in an IP-Address AVP. If the address contained in
the request is invalid, the PAA MUST send a PANA-Error message with the request is invalid, the PAA MUST send a PANA-Error message with a
the result code PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS. Otherwise, the PAA MUST result code PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS. Otherwise, the PAA MUST update
update the PANA session with the new PaC address and return a the PANA session with the new PaC address and return a
PANA-Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Answer message. If there is an established PANA SA, both
PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected
with a MAC AVP. with a MAC AVP.
5.8 Session Lifetime 5.8 Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The
Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the
PANA-Bind-Request message to inform PaC about the valid lifetime of PANA-Bind-Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime
the PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA of the PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages. messages.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by PaC to The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
manage PANA-related state. PaC does not have to perform any actions PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
when the lifetime expires, other than optionally purging local state. any actions when the lifetime expires, other than optionally purging
PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re-authentication before the current session local state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication
lifetime expires. phase before the current session lifetime expires.
PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to The PaC and PAA MAY optionally rely on lower-layer indications to
expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and
reliability of such indications depend on the specific access reliability of such indications depend on the specific access
technologies. PANA peer can use PANA-Ping-Request message to verify technologies. A PANA peer can use the PANA-Ping exchange to verify
the disconnection before taking an action. the disconnection before taking an action.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not require send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
coordination between the peers. require coordination between the peers.
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two authentications. In this case, the smaller authorization two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller
lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA Session-Lifetime authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA
value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication will be Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication
performed in the re-authentication phase. will be performed in the re-authentication phase.
5.9 Network Selection 5.9 Network Selection
In the discovery and handshake phase, a PANA-Start-Request message The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn
sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or one NAP-Information AVP and identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the
zero or more ISP-Information AVPs to advertise the information on the NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the
NAP and/or ISPs. The PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is
an ISP-Information AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC can assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are
choose an ISP and contain an ISP-Information AVP for the chosen ISP served by the NAP.
in a PANA-Start-Answer message even when there is no ISP-Information
AVP contained in the PANA-Start-Request message. When an
ISP-Information AVP is not present in the PANA-Start-Answer message,
a default ISP is automatically chosen by the PAA.
The identity of the destination AAA server or realm MAY be determined A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
based on the the client identifier (e.g., an NAI) carried in the EAP one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
authentication method. Note that AAA typically uses the client's NAI PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an ISP-Information
to route the request to an appropriate home server. PANA's ISP AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC MAY convey its ISP
selection mechanism does not preclude the use of roaming. That is, even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the
the realm provided in the NAI may not match the chosen ISP; all that PANA-Start-Request message. The PaC can do that when it is
is required is that the chosen ISP is capable of routing the request pre-configured with ISP information.
to the realm in the NAI. As a result, PANA's ISP selection feature
does not affect the NAI but rather the next hop AAA entity from the
PAA. Note that this may limit the ability of the access network to
use a local AAA proxy for all outgoing traffic, assuming ISP
selection is needed. This is because the PAA can only affect the
next hop selection at the PAA, and it may not have means to present a
"source route" to the next hop proxy for doing it in the next step.
In the roaming case, the PAA MAY carry ISP-Information AVPs only for
ISPs that are directly connected to the access network it resides,
not for all possible home ISPs.
In addition to performing network selection by using PANA for In the absence of an ISP explicitly selected and conveyed by the PaC,
choosing an ISP, another level of network selection may be performed ISP selection is typically performed based on the client identifier
by using EAP for choosing AAA intermediaries (e.g., using the realm portion of an NAI carried in EAP method). A
[I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery]. The latter network selection backend AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS) will run between the AAA client
occurs over EAP in the authentication and authorization phase after on the PAA and a AAA server in the selected ISP domain.
completion of the former network selection in the discovery and
handshake phase, possibly in the scope of the chosen ISP. The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA
proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through
its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the
selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA
proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in
[I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery] which suggests advertising ISP
information in-band with the ongoing EAP method execution.
Deployments using the PANA's built-in ISP discovery mechanism need
not use the other mechanism.
5.10 Error Handling 5.10 Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a
PANA-Error-Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a PANA-Error-Answer message. If the cause of this error message was a
request message (e.g., PANA-PAA-Discover or *-Request), then the request message (e.g., PANA-PAA-Discover or *-Request), then the
request MAY be retransmitted immediately without waiting for its request MAY be retransmitted immediately without waiting for its
retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the error was a retransmission timer to go off. If the cause of the error was a
response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request message response message, the receiver of the PANA-Error-Request message
SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the next SHOULD NOT resend the same response until it receives the next
request. request.
Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adverseries to launch DoS Erroneous PANA messages may be exploited by adverseries to launch DoS
attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the attacks on the victims. Unless the PaC or PAA rate-limits the
generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be overburdened by
having tp respond to bogus packets. Limiting the number of error having tp respond to bogus messages. Limiting the number of error
notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of notifications sent to a given peer during a (configurable) period of
time may be useful. time may be useful.
When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the When an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., no MAC AVP) and the
lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an lower-layer is insecure, the error message is treated as an
informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST informational message. The receiver of such an error message MUST
NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session NOT change its state unless the error persists and the PANA session
is not making any progress. is not making any progress.
6. PANA Headers and Formats 6. PANA Headers and Formats
  Skipping to change at page 34, line 34:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R(equest) R(equest)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is
an answer. an answer.
S(eparate) S(eparate)
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that PAA is willing to offer separate NAP and ISP indicates that the PAA is willing to offer separate NAP and ISP
authentication. When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Answer authentication. When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Answer
message it indicates that the PaC accepts on performing message it indicates that the PaC accepts on performing
separate NAP and ISP authentication. When the S-flag is set in separate NAP and ISP authentication. When the S-flag is set in
a PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer a PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer
and PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that and PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that
separate NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the separate NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the
authentication and authorization phase. For other cases, authentication and authorization phase. For other cases,
S-flag MUST NOT be set. S-flag MUST NOT be set.
N(AP authentication) N(AP authentication)
  Skipping to change at page 36, line 29:
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r| |V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
M(andatory) M(andatory)
The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether
support of the AVP is required. support of the AVP is required.
If an AVP with the 'M' bit set is received by a PaC or PAA and If an AVP with the 'M' bit set is received by the PaC or PAA
either the AVP or its value is unrecognized, the message MUST and either the AVP or its value is unrecognized, the message
be rejected and the receiver MUST send a PANA-Error message. MUST be rejected and the receiver MUST send a
If the AVP was unrecognized the PANA-Error message result code PANA-Error-Request message. If the AVP was unrecognized the
MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If the AVP value was PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
unrecognized the PANA-Error message result code MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If the AVP value was unrecognized the
PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the PANA-Error message PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP containing the offending mandatory PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the PANA-Error-Request
AVP. message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP containing the offending
mandatory AVP.
AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a
receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not
supported, or whose value is not supported, MAY simply ignore supported, or whose value is not supported, MAY simply ignore
the AVP. the AVP.
V(endor) V(endor)
The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates
whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP
header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor
  Skipping to change at page 38, line 37:
PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.2.8
PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.2.9
PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.2.10
PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.2.11
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.2.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.2.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.2.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.2.15
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.2.16
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.2.17
PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 --------> 7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.2.18
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------- 7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.2.19
----------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------
Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages
7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification 7.2 PANA Message ABNF Specification
Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST [RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST
or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition: or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:
  Skipping to change at page 40, line 47:
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) 7.2.1 PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address
of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero
(0). (0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 > PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR) 7.2.2 PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
PANA-Start-Request (PSR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to advertise The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The PAA sets advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The
the sequence number to an initial random value. PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [SEP] > PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [SEP] >
{ Nonce } { Nonce }
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ] [ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ] * [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability] [ Protection-Capability]
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) 7.2.3 PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in response to The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the handshake response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
to start PANA authentication. handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [SEP] > PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [SEP] >
{ Nonce } { Nonce }
[ Cookie ] [ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ] [ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) 7.2.4 PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) is either sent by the PAA or the PaC. Its The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP. PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [SEP] [NAP] > PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload > < EAP-Payload >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) 7.2.5 PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) is sent by either the PaC or the PAA in THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP-Payload PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an
AVP. EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [SEP] [NAP] > PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) 7.2.6 PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)
PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA to The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
re-initiate EAP authentication. to re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ > PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) 7.2.7 PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)
PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC
to a PANA-Reauth-Request message. in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 > PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) 7.2.8 PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to deliver the The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
result of PANA authentication. deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [SEP] [NAP] > PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
{ PPAC } { PPAC }
{ IP-Address } { IP-Address }
[ EAP-Payload ] [ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ] [ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ] [ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
* [ Device-Id ] * [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) 7.2.9 PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in response to a The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
PANA-Bind-Request message. response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [NAP] > PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ PPAC ] [ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ] [ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) 7.2.10 PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) is either sent by the PaC or the PAA for The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the
performing liveness test. PAA for performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ > PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) 7.2.11 PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) is sent in response to a PANA-Ping-Request. The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a
PANA-Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 > PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) 7.2.12 PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
to terminate a PANA session. or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ > PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause > < Termination-Cause >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) 7.2.13 PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) is sent either by the PaC or the PAA in The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
response to PANA-Termination-Request. or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 > PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER) 7.2.14 PANA-Error-Request (PER)
PANA-Error is sent either by the PaC or the PAA to report an error The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the
with the last received PANA message. PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8 REQ > PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8 REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< Result-Code > < Result-Code >
* [ Failed-AVP ] * [ Failed-AVP ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) 7.2.15 PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
PANA-Error-Answer is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request. The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a
PANA-Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 > PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) 7.2.16 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) is sent by the PAA to the PaC to The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to
signal the result of the first EAP authentication method when the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method
separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed. when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
{ EAP-Payload } { EAP-Payload }
{ Result-Code } { Result-Code }
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) 7.2.17 PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) is sent by the PaC to the PAA in The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to
response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] > PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [SEP] [NAP] >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ] [ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR) 7.2.18 PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
PANA-Update-Request (PUR) is sent by the PaC to the PAA to update the The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
attributes of the PANA session. Currently only the PaC IP address the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope
attribute can be updated via this mechanism. of this specification only the PaC IP address attribute can be
updated via this mechanism. An IP-Address AVP can only be included
in the PUR messages sent by the PaC. The PUR message can be used to
deliver just a notification as well.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ > PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
< IP-Address > [ IP-Address ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) 7.2.19 PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) is sent by the PAA to the PaC in response to The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC in
a PANA-Update-Request. response to a PANA-Update-Request.
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 > PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 >
< Session-Id > < Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ] * [ AVP ]
0*1 < MAC > 0*1 < MAC >
7.3 AVPs in PANA 7.3 AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other
documents such as [RFC3588]. documents such as [RFC3588].
The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and
  Skipping to change at page 46, line 25:
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the 1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message. message.
+-------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PBR|PBA|PDI|PPR|PPA|PTR|PTA| Attribute Name |PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PBR|PBA|PDI|PPR|PPA|PTR|PTA|
--------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
EAP-Payload |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
MAC | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| MAC | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
NAP-Information |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | PPAC |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+ --------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2) Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------+
| Message | | Message |
| Type | | Type |
+----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+ +----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+
Attribute Name |PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA|PER|PEA|PRAR|PRAA| Attribute Name |PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA|PER|PEA|PRAR|PRAA|
--------------------+----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+ --------------------+----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+
Result-Code | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | EAP-Payload | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
MAC |0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 | MAC |0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Notification |0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Cap. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
IP-Address | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
--------------------+----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+ --------------------+----+----+---+---+---+---+----+----+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2) Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
7.3.1 MAC AVP 7.3.1 Cookie AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. The
random value is referred to as a cookie and used for making PAA
discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. The
exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate a cookie does
not affect interoperability and not specified in this document. An
example cookie generation algorithm is shown in Section 4.2.
7.3.2 Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different
link-layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than
that are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for
this AVP.
7.3.3 EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
7.3.4 Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].
7.3.5 IP-Address AVP
The IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 5) contains an IP address of the PaC or
PAA. When it is sent by the PaC, it is used to convey the new IP
address of the PaC to the PAA when the PaC reconfigures its IP
address after the successful PANA authentication. This AVP is not
used if the PaC's IP address used during the authentication and
authorization phase is still valid. It is sent by the PAA in
PANA-Bind-Request to bind the IP address of the PAA to the PANA
session. The payload format of the IP-Address AVP is the same as
that of the Device-Id AVP (see See Section 7.3.2). Address families
for IPv4 or IPv6 MUST be used for this AVP.
7.3.6 ISP-Information AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 6) contains zero or one
Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and
one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP
data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 6 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
7.3.7 Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session.
7.3.8 MAC AVP
The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity The MAC (Message Authentication Code) AVP is used to integrity
protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 1) protect PANA messages. The first octet of the this AVP (AVP Code 8)
data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload data contains the MAC algorithm type. Rest of the AVP data payload
contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm contains the MAC encoded in network byte order. The 8-bit Algorithm
name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies name space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. The AVP length varies
depending on the used algorithm. depending on the used algorithm.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | MAC... | Algorithm | MAC...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  Skipping to change at page 48, line 4:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | MAC... | Algorithm | MAC...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Algorithm Algorithm
1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes) 1 HMAC-SHA1 (20 bytes)
MAC MAC
The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order. The Message Authentication Code is encoded in network byte order.
7.3.2 Device-Id AVP 7.3.9 NAP-Information AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for carrying device The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different
link-layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than
that are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for
this AVP.
7.3.3 Session-Id AVP NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a 7.3.10 Nonce AVP
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 3) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP SHOULD appear immediately following the
PANA header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 10) carries a randomly chosen value that is
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other used in cyrptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive.
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
7.3.4 Cookie AVP 7.3.11 Notification AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying a random value The Notification AVP (AVP Code 11) is optionally used to convey a
generated by the PAA. The AVP data is of type OctetString. The displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be
random value is referred to as a cookie and used for making PAA included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case
discovery robust against blind resource consumption DoS attacks. The a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message
exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate a cookie does to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a
not affect interoperability and not specified in this document. An Notification AVP SHOULD be generated.
example cookie generation algorithm is shown in Section 4.2.
7.3.5 Protection-Capability AVP Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state.
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 5) indicates the AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains UTF-8 encoded ISO
10646 characters [RFC2279]. The length of the displayable message is
determined by the AVP Length field. The message MUST NOT be null
terminated.
7.3.12 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 12) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. At least one or more of the
flags MUST be set when sent by the PAA, and exactly one flag MUST be
set when sent by the PaC. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|D|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags
N (No configuration)
The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent
by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
D (DHCP)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use DHCP
[RFC2131][RFC3315] to configure a new IP address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IP address after PANA.
T (DHCP with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IP address
after PANA.
I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to configure a new
IP address after PANA.
Reserved
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST configure a new IP address
using one of the methods indicated by the other flags. Refer to
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed discussion on when these
methods can be used.
7.3.13 Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 13) indicates the
cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
valid data values and associated protection capabilities: valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION 0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION 1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
7.3.6 Termination-Cause AVP 7.3.14 Provider-Identifier AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type Unsigned32, and
administrative reasons, such as the receipt of a contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Abort-Session-Request message. Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC) 7.3.15 Provider-Name AVP
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated. The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
7.3.7 Result-Code AVP 7.3.16 Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA. [RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.
7.3.7.1 Authentication Results Codes 7.3.16.1 Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
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authorization result. The authentication result and authorization authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001 PANA_SUCCESS 2001
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful. Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001 PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001
Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed. assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003 PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA or rejected locally by a PAA, authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
even if the authentication procedure has succeeded. PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
7.3.7.2 Protocol Error Result Codes 7.3.16.2 Protocol Error Result Codes
These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA. otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001 PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001
Message type not recognized or supported. Message type not recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002 PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002
PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the authentication The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the
server. Only PAA can generate this code. authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008 PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008
A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either
set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent
with the message type definition. with the message type definition.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009 PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009
A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are
set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the
AVP's definition. AVP's definition.
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001 PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001
The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or
supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message
with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing
the AVPs that caused the failure. the AVPs that caused the failure.
  Skipping to change at page 50, line 48:
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001 PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001
The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or
supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message
with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing
the AVPs that caused the failure. the AVPs that caused the failure.
PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002 PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002
The message contained an unknown Session-Id. PAA MUST NOT send The message contained an unknown Session-Id. A PANA message
this error result code value to PaC if PaC sent an unknown indicating this error MUST include the unknown Session-Id AVP
Session-Id in the PANA-Start-Answer message (session resumption). within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 5004 PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 5004
The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data
portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005 PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005
The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message
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Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the
Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP
should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes. should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.
PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006 PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006
A message was received that cannot be authorized because the A message was received that cannot be authorized because the
client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this
error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session
and attempts to establish a second session. Only PAA can generate and attempts to establish a second session. Only the PAA can
this code. generate this code.
PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007 PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007
The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each
other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One
or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that
contradicted each other. Only PAA can generate this code. contradicted each other. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008 PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008
A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The
Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the
offending AVP. offending AVP.
PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009 PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009
A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
  Skipping to change at page 52, line 4:
offending AVP. offending AVP.
PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009 PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009
A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of
the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences. the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011 PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011
This error is returned when a message was received, whose version This error is returned when a message was received, whose version
number is unsupported. number is unsupported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012 PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012
This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified
reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP
pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP-Failure message pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP Failure message
to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in
PANA-Error-Request message. the PANA-Error-Request message.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014 PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014
The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The
PANA-Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the PANA-Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP. offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015 PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015
This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid
message length. message length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016 PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016
This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but does not message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid MAC AVP but
support the protection capability specified in the does not support the protection capability specified in the
Protection-Capability AVP. Only PaC can generate this code. Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017 PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
This error is returned when there is no match between the list of This error is returned when there is no match between the list of
PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC. PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC.
Only PaC can generate this code. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 5018 PANA_INVALID_IP_ADDRESS 5018
This error is returned in a PANA-Error-Request message when the This error is returned in a PANA-Error-Request message when the
IP-Address AVP in the received PANA-Update-Request message is IP-Address AVP in the received PANA-Update-Request message is
invalid (e.g., a non-unicast address). Only PAA can generate this invalid (e.g., a non-unicast address). Only the PAA can generate
code. this code.
7.3.8 EAP-Payload AVP 7.3.17 Session-Id AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 8) is used for encapsulating the actual All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
EAP packet that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 17) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString. session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP SHOULD appear immediately following the
PANA header.
7.3.9 Session-Lifetime AVP The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 9) contains the number of seconds 7.3.18 Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 18) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32. data is of type Unsigned32.
7.3.10 Failed-AVP AVP 7.3.19 Termination-Cause AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 10) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].
7.3.11 NAP-Information AVP
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 11) contains zero or one
Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and
one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP
data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 11 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
7.3.12 ISP-Information AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 12) contains zero or one
Provider-Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and
one Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP
data is of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 12 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
7.3.13 Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 13) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
7.3.14 Provider-Name AVP
The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
7.3.15 Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session.
7.3.16 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 16) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. At least one or more of the
flags MUST be set when sent by the PAA, and exactly one flag MUST be
set when sent by the PaC. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|D|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags
N (No configuration)
The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent
by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
D (DHCP)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use DHCP
[RFC2131][RFC3315] to configure a new IP address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IP address after PANA.
T (DHCP with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IP address
after PANA.
I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to configure a new
IP address after PANA.
Reserved The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA.
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST configure a new IP address The client initiated a disconnect
using one of the methods indicated by the other flags. Refer to
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed discussion on when these
methods can be used.
7.3.17 Nonce AVP ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 17) carries a randomly chosen value that is The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
used in cyrptographic key computations. The AVP data is of type administrative reasons.
OctetString and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque
format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes inclusive.
7.3.18 IP-Address AVP SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The IP-Address AVP (AVP Code 18) contains an IP address of the PaC or The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
PAA. When it is sent by the PaC, it is used to convey the new IP
address of the PaC to the PAA when the PaC reconfigures its IP
address after the successful PANA authentication. This AVP is not
used if the PaC's IP address used during the authentication and
authorization phase is still valid. It is sent by the PAA in
PANA-Bind-Request to bind the IP address of the PAA to the PANA
session. The payload format of the IP-Address AVP is the same as
that of the Device-Id AVP (see See Section 7.3.2). Address families
for IPv4 or IPv6 MUST be used for this AVP.
8. Retransmission Timers 8. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover
and request messages. message and all request messages, with the exception that the
PANA-Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the
The rule is that the sender of the request message retransmits the PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery.
request if the corresponding answer is not received in time. Answer
messages are sent as answers to the request messages, not based on a
timer.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender message exchange terminates when either the request sender
successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message
exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission
mechanism described below. mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
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If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met. met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response. message until it receives a response.
8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters 8.1 Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests (REQ_*) and retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are
PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The table shows default values. retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The
table shows default values.
Parameter Default Description Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout. PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout.
PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value. PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value.
PDI_MRC 0 Configurable. PDI_MRC 0 Configurable.
PDI_MRD 0 Configurable. PDI_MRD 0 Configurable.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
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The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF 0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See
Section 7.2.1 through Section 7.2.19 for the assignment of the Section 7.2.1 through Section 7.2.19 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification. namespace in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between communicating PaC and PAA using experimental interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP]. experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
9.3.2 Flags 9.3.2 Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2 document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2
('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via ('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via
a Standards Action [IANA]. a Standards Action [IANA].
9.4 AVP Header 9.4 AVP Header
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The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their
vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of
a Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA a Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA. possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-18. AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-19.
See Section 7.3.1 through Section 7.3.18 for the assignment of the See Section 7.3.8 through Section 7.3.5 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification. namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification
Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time
for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus. for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
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9.5 AVP Values 9.5 AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA]. Served basis by IANA [IANA].
9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP 9.5.1 Algorithm Values of MAC AVP
As defined in Section 7.3.1, the Algorithm field of MAC AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 7.3.8, the Algorithm field of MAC AVP (AVP Code
1) defines the value of 1 (one) for HMAC-SHA1. 8) defines the value of 1 (one) for HMAC-SHA1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
9.5.2 Protection-Capability AVP Values 9.5.2 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.5, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code As defined in Section 7.3.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
5) defines the values 0 and 1. (AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('D':
DHCP), 2 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 3 ('T': DHCP with IPsec
tunnel mode) and 4 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA]. Action [IANA].
9.5.3 Termination-Cause AVP Values 9.5.3 Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.6, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 6) As defined in Section 7.3.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
defines the values 1, 4 and 8. 13) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
[IANA]. Action [IANA].
9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values 9.5.4 Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.7.1 and Section 7.3.7.2 the Result-Code AVP As defined in Section 7.3.16.1 and Section 7.3.16.2 the Result-Code
(AVP Code 7) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001, AVP (AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009,
5001-5009 and 5011-5019. 4001, 5001-5009 and 5011-5019.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA]. [IANA].
9.5.5 Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values 9.5.5 Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 7.3.16, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP As defined in Section 7.3.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19)
(AVP Code 17) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('D': defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
DHCP), 2 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 3 ('T': DHCP with IPsec
tunnel mode) and 4 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
Action [IANA]. [IANA].
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security
threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined
in [I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval]. Security considerations stemming in [I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval]. Security considerations stemming
from the use of EAP and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748]. This from the use of EAP and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748]. This
section provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are section provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are
related to PANA framework and protocol design. related to PANA framework and protocol design.
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link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled link-layer. In these examples, the lower-layer security is enabled
even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the
absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be absence of such a pre-established secure channel, one needs to be
created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer created in conjunction with PANA using a link-layer or network-layer
cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec). cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
10.1 General Security Measures 10.1 General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session. PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
Since PaC and PAA are on the same IP link, a simple TTL check on the Since the PaC and PAA are on the same IP link, a simple TTL check on
received PANA messages prevents off-link attacks. the received PANA messages prevents off-link attacks.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and verified
against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence
number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In
addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP messages and
duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary
spoof messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it can spoof messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it can
also eavesdrop to synchronize on the expected sequence number. also eavesdrop to synchronize on the expected sequence number.
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(i.e., a request or answer with an unexpected sequence number) and (i.e., a request or answer with an unexpected sequence number) and
any duplicate answer are immediately discarded, and a duplicate any duplicate answer are immediately discarded, and a duplicate
request can trigger transmission of the cached answer (i.e., no need request can trigger transmission of the cached answer (i.e., no need
to process the request and generate a new answer). to process the request and generate a new answer).
The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
that is received from the segment of the access network where only that is received from the segment of the access network where only
PaCs are supposed to be connected. the PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported
by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating per-packet MAC to by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating per-packet MAC to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP
message). message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the MAC verification is silently discarded. The fails to pass the MAC verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first
PANA-Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request that signals a PANA-Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals
successful authentication is generated. Starting with these a successful authentication is generated. Starting with these
messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn
down can be cryptographically protected. down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication. there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is
bounded by the lifetime granted by the authentication server. An bounded by the lifetime granted by the authentication server. An
implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value. Unless the implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value. Unless the
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the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of
Protection-Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a Protection-Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a
PANA-Start-Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to PANA-Start-Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to
denial-of service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the denial-of service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the
discovery and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT discovery and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT
RECOMMENDED. The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected RECOMMENDED. The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected
PANA-Bind-Request upon successful authentication. PANA-Bind-Request upon successful authentication.
10.3 EAP Methods 10.3 EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP packets might cause problems when the EAP method is Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Identity payload is used then it allows the the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent. problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the
deployment environment an EAP authentication which supports user deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports
identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks and user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks
session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method. EAP method.
10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication 10.4 Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same
PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP, PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP,
and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant
authorization, which is a combination of the individual authorization, which is a combination of the individual
authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside
  Skipping to change at page 66, line 15:
Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP
authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is
the combination of both keys. the combination of both keys.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA
SA, PANA_MAC_KEY and key ID. SA, PANA_MAC_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a separate enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a separate
PaC-EP master key is generated based on the AAA-Key, session ID, key PaC-EP master key is generated based on the AAA-Key, session
ID, and EP ID. identifier, key identifier, and EP device identifier.
The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] to produce further cipher-specific and
transient keys. transient keys.
10.6 Per-packet Ciphering 10.6 Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
  Skipping to change at page 66, line 50:
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3 The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication, physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP. EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The
session ID and EP's device ID are taken into computation for session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into
achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. Compromise of an EP computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].
does not automatically lead to compromise of another EP or the PAA. Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of
another EP or the PAA.
10.8 Liveness Test 10.8 Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages. disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive. This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the alive.
peer might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data
This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the peer
might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data
traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this
exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care as it might result exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care as it might result
in congestion and hence false alarms. This exchange is in congestion and hence false alarms.
cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is available in order to
prevent threats associated with the abuse of this functionality. This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address 10.9 Updating PaC's IP Address
Even though the IP-Address AVP in a PANA-Update-Request can be Even though the IP-Address AVP in a PANA-Update-Request can be
cryptographically protected by the MAC AVP, there is not way to prove cryptographically protected by the MAC AVP, there is not way to prove
the ownership of the IP address presented by the PaC. Hence an the ownership of the IP address presented by the PaC. Hence an
authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by spoofing a victim's IP authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by spoofing a victim's IP
address. address.
10.10 Early Termination of a Session 10.10 Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present. is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
11. Open Issues and Change History 11. Acknowledgments
A list of open issues is maintained at [1].
Open issues: 114, 115, 117, 149 and 150.
Issues resolved in PANA-07c December 2004: 112, 113, 116, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,
134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148,
151, 152 and 153.
12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo
and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments
to this document. to this document.
13. References 12. References
13.1 Normative References 12.1 Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC [RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
2131, March 1997. 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission [RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission
Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000. Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000.
  Skipping to change at page 71, line 5:
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-04 (work in Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-04 (work in
progress), November 2004. progress), November 2004.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
13.2 Informative References 12.2 Informative References
[I-D.ietf-pana-requirements] [I-D.ietf-pana-requirements]
Yegin, A. and Y. Ohba, "Protocol for Carrying Yegin, A. and Y. Ohba, "Protocol for Carrying
Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Requirements", Authentication for Network Access (PANA)Requirements",
draft-ietf-pana-requirements-09 (work in progress), August draft-ietf-pana-requirements-09 (work in progress), August
2004. 2004.
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management [RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999. Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.
[I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval] [I-D.ietf-pana-threats-eval]
Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access Threat Analysis and Security and Network Access Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-07 (work in Requirements", draft-ietf-pana-threats-eval-07 (work in
progress), August 2004. progress), August 2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA enabling IPsec based Access Parthasarathy, M., "PANA enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-04 (work in progress), Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-05 (work in progress),
September 2004. December 2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] [I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework", Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",
draft-ietf-pana-framework-02 (work in progress), September draft-ietf-pana-framework-02 (work in progress), September
2004. 2004.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., Ohba, Y. and J. Bournelle, "SNMP usage for Mghazli, Y., Ohba, Y. and J. Bournelle, "SNMP usage for
PAA-2-EP interface", draft-ietf-pana-snmp-02 (work in PAA-2-EP interface", draft-ietf-pana-snmp-02 (work in
progress), October 2004. progress), October 2004.
  Skipping to change at page 72, line 8:
2004. 2004.
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information] [I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]
Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-00 Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-00
(work in progress), September 2004. (work in progress), September 2004.
[I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery] [I-D.adrangi-eap-network-discovery]
Adrangi, F., "Mediating Network Discovery in the Adrangi, F., "Mediating Network Discovery in the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-adrangi-eap-network-discovery-06 (work in progress), draft-adrangi-eap-network-discovery-07 (work in progress),
December 2004. December 2004.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org. [ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] [IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004. Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
URIs [RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[1] <http://danforsberg.info:8080/pana-issues/>
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407 P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470 Phone: +358 50 4839470